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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library £>f Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/someproblemsofph01alex 



SOME PROBLEMS OF 
PHILOSOPHY 



ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
COLUMBIA COLLEGE 










NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1886 



■*MM 




THE LIBRARY 
OF CONORbSS 

WA1HIKGTON 



- 



Copyright, 1886, 
By CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 



The Riverside Press ^ Cambridge: 
Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Co. 



CONTENTS. 



I. The Difficulties of Philosophy . . / 
II. The Problem of the Ultimate Nature 

of Matter ...... 23 

III. The Problem of the Origin of Organic 

Being ...... 39 

IV. Some Difficulties connected with any 

Doctrine of the Ego . . . 44 
V. Unconscious Mental States . . 47 
VI. The Problem of Physiological Psychol- 
ogy 53 

VII. Reason in Contradiction to Reason . 64 

VIII. The Relation of Belief to Knowledge 66 

IX. The Problem of the Human Will . . jy 

X. The Immortality of the Soul . . 80 

XL The Feeling of Obligation and Moral 

Knowledge . . 9 . . 83 

XII. Is Hedonism equivalent to Pessimism? 93 

XIII. The Ethical Conflict . . . * 97 



iv Contents. 

XIV. The Doctrine of a Fir si Cause . 104 

XV. The Infinite . . . . . 112 

XVI. God and the Principle of Right . 118 

XVII. The Atheistic Meaning of Pantheism . 121 

XVIII. The Doctrine of Cause and Effect . 123 



SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOS- 
OPHY. 



I. 

The Difficulties of Philosophy. 

To enumerate all of the difficulties of 
Philosophy which have thus far not been 
wholly removed would be to give a synop- 
sis of a philosophical system. It is possi- 
ble, however, to classify the problems and 
the difficulties which lie in the way of those 
who study Philosophy, and the recognition 
of obstacles is usually the first step toward 
their removal. 

The most apparent difficulties of philo- 
sophical investigation are what may be 
called popular difficulties. They are sel- 
dom real. They are usually fictitious, ere- 



2 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ated by ignorant or superficial persons. 
They are intended to excite prejudice 
against philosophical science by emphasiz- 
ing its inutility, its absurdity, sometimes 
its mischievous character. Those who 
raise these difficulties ordinarily talk about 
" Metaphysics " as if it were all of Philoso- 
phy. Some of them imagine that each 
man has his own system, which is as good 
as the system of any other man. They 
will expound their views about the idleness 
of " metaphysical study " as lightly as they 
will tell an after-dinner story. It is not 
uncommon to hear them scoff at the study 
of Logic, and in this is often to be found 
an explanation of their position. It is not 
worth while for me to criticise such views. 
A man who has not learned the alphabet is 
usually deficient in a knowledge of gram- 
mar. A surgeon who does not know anat- 
omy is not likely to inspire confidence. 
The philosophical dilettante who plunges 
into the solution of problems of great im- 
portance without scientific preparation may 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 3 

be left to the task of u drawing out levia- 
than with a hook," and one need not be 
disturbed if his unsuccessful efforts lead 
him to the conclusion that " metaphysics " 
is obscure, useless, and irreligious. 

The inductive branches of Philosophy, 
such as Psychology, for example, present a 
great many difficulties which are common 
to all branches of science — difficulties of 
observation or experiment, of the interpre- 
tation of facts, of the confirming of hypoth- 
eses, of the establishment of laws. It is 
not necessary that these common but not 
insuperable difficulties should be exten- 
sively noticed. It may be pointed out, 
however, that the difficulties of mental sci- 
ence are increased by the necessity of em- 
ploying a subjective, as well as an objec- 
tive method. Self-consciousness cannot be 
aided in its observation by any instru- 
ments, and it is extremely liable to make 
mistakes, because its testimony cannot be 
directly corroborated. Beyond this pecul- 
iarity, there is nothing which distinguishes 



4 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

the general difficulties of inductive philos- 
ophy from those of the natural sciences. 

But all the inductive sciences lead ulti- 
mately to Metaphysics. I do not mean 
" Metaphysics " in a popular sense, but in 
the Aristotelian sense, as the Science of 
Being, and we have a class of difficulties 
presented which cannot be satisfactorily 
removed by induction. We are brought at 
once to the region of speculation. Such 
problems are essentially metaphysical, and 
the question as to the possibility of Meta- 
physics is suggested. The mental sciences, 
whether they be inductive or not, as soon 
as they border upon Metaphysics present 
difficulties, often of the most perplexing 
kind, and in the mysterious country lying 
between Theology and Philosophy many a 
hopeful, speculative mind has been lost in 
doubt or extravagant theory. There are 
difficulties which may be regarded as fun- 
damental, and in accordance with what has 
been said we may classify them as : — 

I. Purely metaphysical. 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 5 

2. Arising from the relations of the men* 
tal sciences to one another. 

3. Arising from the relations of Theol* 
ogy to Philosophy. 

As examples of the first set of diffi- 
culties may be named such problems as 
that of Substance, of Space and Time, of 
Cause and Effect, of the ultimate nature 
of matter. These are usually suggested by 
investigation in the natural sciences. The 
solution of these problems, the removal of 
such difficulties, is not essential to the 
progress of the inductive science, in rela- 
tion to which the question may be raised. 
Chemistry can proceed independently of 
any metaphysical answer to the question 
what is substance. The investigator of 
Physics does not suspend his experiments 
until the metaphysician has explained the 
nature of causation. Even the biologist is 
undisturbed in his investigations of phe- 
nomena, although always confronted by 
the unanswered question "What is Life. ,, 
While every inductive science presents 



6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

problems of this kind, none furnishes a 
means of solution. Induction is accom- 
plished by means of experience, and expe- 
rience does not extend beyond the wide 
field of phenomena. But while this is so, 
it cannot be denied that these ultimate 
questions are presented. If an answer is 
possible, it must be metaphysical, and the 
problem of the possibility of Metaphysics 
is raised. Men are not content with the 
mere facts of experience. The History of 
Philosophy shows a continuous series of 
thinkers endeavoring to explain the nature 
of Being as distinguished from the mani- 
fold and changing world of appearances, 
and too often the result has been disas- 
trous failure. This history of failures has 
led some to the conclusion that failure is 
the inevitable consequence of metaphysical 
inquiry. It may be well to notice this 
view, together with the views of some rep* 
resentative philosophers concerning meta» 
physical problems in general. To use a 
familiar method of classification, metaphys- 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 7 

ics may be considered in three different 
ways : — 

1. Skeptically. 

2. Dogmatically. 

3. Critically. 

It was at one time supposed that the 
method of experience might accomplish a 
solution of metaphysical problems. This 
supposition was shown by David Hume to 
be without foundation. If experience be 
the true method, then Metaphysics as a sci- 
ence is impossible. The empirical method 
is that of the skeptic. 

The skeptic denies that metaphysical 
problems can be solved. What was for- 
merly called Skepticism or Nescience is 
now known as Agnosticism. The position 
is briefly this. Science is limited to phe- 
nomena or appearances. When it attempts 
to go beyond the phenomena, it is dealing 
with what is unknown ; it ceases to be sci- 
ence. If we ask, then, what is the nature 
of matter or mind, no answer can be given. 
If we ask what is the nature of causation, 



8 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

we get no answer except that science gives 
no account of a connection between a cause 
and its effect. This view was well repre- 
sented by Auguste Comte, who felt the 
force of Hume's doctrine. The age of 
Metaphysics, he held, is past. Science 
must concern itself with the data of the 
senses and with these alone. It is not 
denied by the skeptic that the difficulties 
exist ; it is maintained, however, that they 
are insuperable. 

Dogmatism is a very comprehensive 
term, and most of the great systems of an- 
cient and mediaeval times were dogmatic. 
It answers without much hesitation the 
questions of Metaphysics. It defines Be- 
ing, Substance, Causation, Space and Time, 
but its definitions are not very valuable. 
They put into other terms the ideas to be 
explained, but do not go much further. 

The dogmatist affirms with some reason 
that as we have these clear, distinct, and 
comparatively adequate ideas we must re- 
gard them as real, or he asserts that while 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 9 

our senses do not give us metaphysical 
truth, we reach by intuition that which is 
inaccessible to sense. But to the attacks 
of the skeptic the dogmatist can offer no 
resistance except a general denial. 

The critical philosopher admits the va- 
lidity of the skeptic's conclusions, but de- 
nies the truth of his premises. Given a 
great body of knowledge, subtract from 
this knowledge all the ideas of experience. 
If there is no remainder the empirical po- 
sition is valid and the result is skepticism. 
But if there be a remainder, what then ? 
How shall we account for this remainder, 
especially if it be found to consist not of 
merely accidental ideas, but of ideas with- 
out which sensible experience can have no 
meaning ? It is this condition of things 
which suggests the value of analysis. 

One of the most difficult things to de- 
termine is, how far shall analysis be carried 
in dealing with metaphysical matters ? It 
is held by some that analysis must be con- 
fined within very narrow limits. Descartes, 



io Some Problems of Philosophy. 

however, in his " Rules of Method/' in- 
sisted on the separation of ideas into the 
least complex parts. Suppose the advisa- 
bility of analyzing such a term as knowl- 
edge be questioned. I may say I know 
that tree. One school of modern philoso- 
phy holds that scientific thought must 
begin with such knowledge . . . with a 
"knowledge of things." It is asserted that 
any position which falls short of this can 
never be maintained without skepticism. 
But it is by no means certain that we be- 
gin with a " knowledge of things." We 
must analyze this knowledge, find in the 
case of the " tree " what elements of sen- 
sation compose the knowledge of the thing, 
and whether there be a non-sensational ele- 
ment. In such a case analysis is impera- 
tive ; if appeal be made to an intuition of 
the thing, the intuition must be analyzed. 
Analysis should be arrested only in the 
presence of ultimate ideas. It is, for ex- 
ample, impossible to resolve our sensation 
of a single sound into any simpler psycho- 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 1 1 

logical elements. Knowledge as a purely- 
subjective affection is entirely simple. We 
may show by what processes it is brought 
about with reference to the nervous sys- 
tem and its environment, but analysis can 
go no farther. I need not say that in the 
" Critique of Pure Reason " the analytic 
method is illustrated very fully. This 
method is essential if we would establish a 
sound system of Metaphysics. Nor need 
I dwell upon the importance of synthesis 
as a supplement to the analytic method. 
Knowledge comes to the mind synthetic- 
ally, and after analyzing it, it is necessary 
that the process should be explained by 
means of which it assumes a synthetic 
form. It will be shown in another section 
how analysis may be pursued even after 
metaphysical principles have been reached 
by analytical processes. What I would 
here insist upon is the supreme necessity 
of thorough analysis before a metaphysical 
principle can be established. 

In proportion as the difficulties of pure 



12 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

Metaphysics are recognized, are not cast 
aside by the skeptic nor overlooked by the 
dogmatist, the other branches of Philoso- 
phy will be progressive. Psychology should 
be especially benefited, for more than half 
the differences between different schools 
of Psychology are differences with respect 
to metaphysical doctrines which should not 
impede the tranquil progress of the induc- 
tive science of mind. 

But in the second place, difficulties of 
some importance are caused by the rela- 
tion of the several mental sciences to one 
another. The conclusions of the psychol- 
ogist often conflict with those of the moral- 
ist, and certain metaphysical principles are 
at variance with the principles of Ethics. 
Processes of logic are confused by minute 
psychological analysis, and one is some- 
times tempted to regard the mental sciences 
as independent rather than as branches of 
one philosophical tree. Such difficulties 
are exemplified in the great problems of 
Ethics, owing to the conflict between man's 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 13 

natural inclination and the moral ideal, or 
between the determination of the will and 
the essential feeling of responsibility. One 
of the most perplexing questions is that as 
to which of the mental sciences should be 
the foundation of the other. Must Psy- 
chology be made to conform to the prin- 
ciples of an already established system of 
Metaphysics ? Must we wait until we have 
a perfect Psychology before we can lay 
down principles of Ethics ? Probably noth- 
ing has so impeded the advance of philo- 
sophical inquiry as the exaggerated impor- 
tance attached to the relationship between 
the mental sciences. The inductive in- 
quiry into the facts of the mind has been 
hindered by being pursued in a narrow 
metaphysical channel. Weak systems of 
Metaphysics have been built upon an ex- 
clusively psychological foundation. Psy- 
chological doctrines have been warped and 
twisted for the sake of supporting some 
favorite ethical principle, and often moral 
systems have been propounded which might 



14 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

have been made for inanimate objects, so 
little have they been in agreement with 
the minds of living beings. Some of the 
more important of these difficulties I shall 
consider in another place. In general it 
may be said that induction is a failure if it 
is carried on so as to support a special 
theory. The theory may be the only way 
of interpreting facts already observed, but 
it exists for the facts, and not the facts for 
the theory. As Bacon said : " Nature to 
be commanded must be obeyed." The ap- 
parent conflict between some principles of 
Ethics and of Psychology has sometimes 
led philosophers to draw a distinction be- 
tween theoretical and practical science. 
This has the advantage of giving the mor- 
alist a chance to advance independently by 
treating Ethics as the science of Conduct, 
and by setting aside as irrelevant what is 
called the Metaphysics of Ethics. An ob- 
jection to this radical distinction is that the 
problem is suggested, what is the relation 
between the theoretical and the practical ? 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 15 

Considering the important part played by 
the emotions and the will in the sphere 
of moral action, it seems proper that a 
close connection should be shown to ex- 
ist between the laws of thinking and feel- 
ing and the laws of action. It is undoubt- 
edly true that much light has been shed 
on Psychology by investigations in Ethics, 
but the relation between the two sciences 
is one of the most difficult points to set- 
tle. The metaphysical discussions as to 
the nature of the concept or notion, and 
the psychological discussions as to the na- 
ture of the understanding, have had a most 
important effect on Logic and have greatly 
increased its difficulties. One may take as 
an example the questions raised by John 
Stuart Mill's doctrine of reasoning. In 
this case the general character and value 
of the syllogism were brought into ques- 
tion. The theory that all the more com- 
plex mental actions were the result of the 
Association of Ideas would entirely revolu- 
tionize the procedure of Deductive Logic ; 



1 6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

so that Logic, which was once regarded as 
an almost finished and formal science, has 
been brought, by controversies in Meta- 
physics and Psychology, into a more con- 
spicuous position. A work like the " Prin- 
ciples of Logic," by Mr. Bradley, for exam- 
ple, shows how serious are the difficulties 
which meet one on the very threshold of 
the subject — difficulties as to the concept, 
the judgment, and the syllogism. But 
there are still further the difficulties aris- 
ing from the relation of Ethics to what is 
secondarily a branch of Philosophy. I mean 
the science of Casuistry. Even after one 
has established a theoretical code for the 
guidance of moral agents, it is found that 
the line which divides right action from 
wrong is not always invariable. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the re- 
lations of the human mind to the material 
world, the intimate connection between 
nervous and cerebral action and sensation 
and thought, the imminent importance of 
the theory of development, have put Psy- 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. ij 

chology in an uncertain position ; and all 
the difficulties connected with a state of 
transition in this important science con- 
front the inquirer of the present day. 

Then there are the difficulties which arise 
from the relations existing between Theol- 
ogy and Philosophy. I am not referring to 
the so-called conflict between Science and 
Religion, but to certain scientific or specu- 
lative difficulties with which Philosophy is 
concerned and which are intimately con- 
nected with Theology. Religion is in the 
habit of asking almost too much help from 
Philosophy, and one may say in passing 
that the supernatural character of Religion 
separates it on most important questions 
from Philosophy, but there are many ques- 
tions raised by Theology which can only 
be answered by Philosophy. 

The most lively disputes that the intel- 
lectual world has seen have been on that 
common ground occupied by theologians 
and philosophers. The whole character of 
Ethics has been changed by the pressure of 



1 8 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

theological schools. No sooner is a belief 
expressed by the theologian as to the prob- 
lems concerning God, the world, and man, 
than philosophers, both friendly and hos- 
tile, take the field and the fight begins. 
How far the methods of Science can be 
applied to the doctrines of Theology is still 
an open question. 

I have thus far gone rapidly over some 
of the points at which difficulties arise, 
preparatory to passing to a specific discus- 
sion of them. To many the idea of dwell- 
ing on the difficulties of Philosophy is re- 
pugnant. It is natural for men to say, why 
should you emphasize the obstacles in our 
way ? it is better to point out paths upon 
which one may advance with ease and free- 
dom. The answer is very simple. The 
way to reach a safe position is to examine 
as many difficlties as may present them- 
selves, not as an end in itself, but as a step 
preparatory to removing them. Many of 
them cannot be removed, and if such be 
the case, it is well to know it and frankly to 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. ig 

confess it. Next to success in overcoming 
a difficulty is honesty in recognizing one, 
and those ages in which . obstacles have 
been fairly met have been the most fertile 
in philosophical thought. It is well to 
avoid the extreme of throwing aside all 
fundamental problems of Philosophy and 
saying that they are insoluble. But it is 
equally necessary to avoid the other ex- 
treme of resting satisfied with half-sup- 
ported statements, and of relying on tradi- 
tional opinions which modern investigation 
has shown to be untenable. We are no 
longer living in a time when Philosophy is 
regarded as a species of mental calisthen- 
ics, when Logic is thought to be a kind of 
higher grammar, and Psychology a useful 
discipline to the mind of " the youth," 
teaching him introspection. Philosophy, 
by virtue of recent discoveries as well as by 
the strong impetus of development inher- 
ent in it, is now in correlation with the 
whole field of science. It seems to me of 
some importance that the respectable idea 



20 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

should be banished, that a year's study of 
a text-book of " Mental Philosophy " is all 
that is necessary to put a man en rapport 
with the state of thought in the present. 
There is too much amateur philosophizing 
in our society, and not enough scientific 
philosophy. The presentation of difficul- 
ties, indeed a negative attitude toward 
many unsettled questions, serves a double 
purpose ; it calls the attention of the igno- 
rant to the fact that Philosophy is not to 
be mastered in a year, and it stimulates 
those who will pursue only the path of pa- 
tient scientific labor. 

The advantages of thus emphasizing dif- 
ficulties, even if they cannot be removed, 
are shown conspicuously in the History 
of Philosophy. Almost all the great sys- 
tems of the past have arisen under the 
stimulus of questionings, doubt, and nega- 
tion. The philosophy of the Socratic age 
owed much to the restless disputation of 
the Sophists. The Patristic philosophy 
was primarily called into existence by the 



The Difficulties of Philosophy. 21 

negations of the opponents of Christianity. 
Both Bacon and Descartes built their con- 
structive work on the ruins left by their 
doubts and denials. The principal systems 
of our own day owe their character in great 
measure to the destructive skepticism of 
Hume. In the development of human 
thought, negative philosophy has its place. 
Viewed alone, skepticism is not an admira- 
ble attitude. It suggests despair to many 
of its devotees ; its ethics have no ray of 
light. It either will not look for God, or if 
it looks, it looks in vain. It fails to ex- 
plain human knowledge, human life, or hu- 
man destiny. But in spite of the graves 
which it has left along the path of philo- 
sophical progress, it is but right to say 
that skepticism has its important use in 
awakening men from intellectual torpor 
and stimulating them to activity in sci- 
ence. 

It is with the object in view of pointing 
out a few of the difficult points of philo- 
sophical inquiry that I have put together 



22 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

the fragments of discussion which follow, 
at the risk of illustrating the old saying, 
" Plus negare potest asinus quam probare 
philosophus." 



II. 

The Problem of the Ultimate Nature of Matter. 

If we avoid speculation and confine our- 
selves to scientific inquiry, the philosoph- 
ical meaning of our problem is very simple. 
The question what is matter, may mean in 
general one of two things, — either a de- 
scription of material phenomena or an anal- 
ysis of the continuous substance which may 
underlie those phenomena. In the former 
case we may proceed indefinitely in telling 
in succession not merely of the color, re- 
sistance, sound, taste, and smell of mate- 
rial objects, but also of the various forms, 
the physical and chemical properties, which 
science reveals to us. In the latter case 
we must pass to some extent beyond these 
appearances and seek to discover what is 
the ultimate nature of that, of which those 
phenomena are the manifestation to sense. 



24 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

A treatment of this subject in a few words 
is to some extent inadequate, but answers 
to the following questions may lead to a 
proper view of the problem before us : — 

i. Is the solution to be found in terms 
of Metaphysics ? 

2. Is the solution to be found by phys- 
ical experiment ? 

3. Is the solution to be found by any 
logical process ? 

4. Is the solution to be found in estab- 
lishing an hypothesis of the ultimate na- 
ture of matter consistent with material 
phenomena ? 

In case that each of the first three solu- 
tions should be found to be impossible, it 
is reasonable (without the formal fallacy of 
" composition ") to conclude that, taken to- 
gether, they do not bring us any nearer to 
the end which we have in view. It is ob- 
vious that the fourth possible solution sug- 
gested is to some extent a combination of 
that which is metaphysical and that which 
is physical. If, therefore, we conclude that 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 25 

no purely logical process will lead us to 
a satisfactory conclusion, I hope to show- 
that the fourth of the above solutions sug- 
gested, not being essentially related to the 
third, is representative of whatever may be 
of value in a combination of the first and 
second. 

1. Is the solution of the problem to be 
found in terms of Metaphysics ? I am dis- 
posed to think that this question may be 
asked with greater hopes of an affirmative 
answer than the other three. In seeking 
a metaphysical, by which I mean an onto- 
logical, explanation of matter, we leave be- 
hind us the material phenomena, and ask 
whether there is anything either known or 
unknown which we may call matter, which 
is not phenomenal ? If it be said that 
there is an intuition of matter, it must be 
asked what knowledge is given in such an 
intuition. The answer must be, the knowl- 
edge in the intuition is either phenomenal 
or not phenomenal, or it is both. If it be 
said that it is phenomenal, the solution is 



26 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

not metaphysical. If it be said that it is 
not phenomenal, then the matter of the in- 
tuition is not phenomenal, and so must be 
known or unknown ; if it is unknown, there 
is no solution of our problem ; if it is known, 
what is that knowledge ? We have con- 
cluded that it cannot be a knowledge of 
phenomena, so that it must be a knowledge 
of something behind or beneath the phe- 
nomena. The Agnostic asserts that this 
something is an unknowable force, but as 
has been often pointed out, if the substra- 
tum of phenomena be an unknown force, 
then in so far as it is held to be a force it 
ceases to be unknown. It is known to be 
a force, and in so far as phenomena are 
known, the force is known. If, therefore, 
this unknowable force be held to be an uni- 
versal principle, all our knowledge must be 
a knowledge of that which is unknowable. 
If we deny that the phenomena are related 
to the unknowable force, we deny that the 
unknowable force is an universal principle. 
If we affirm that the phenomena are mani- 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 27 

festations of an universal principle, then 
we affirm that we do not know whether 
this unknowable force is manifested in the 
phenomena, known or not, and we must af- 
firm that Agnosticism is absurd, or that it 
has no reason for postulating the existence 
of anything except the phenomena them- 
selves. 

It follows from what has just been said 
that if the agnostic position be given up 
and the proposition be advanced that there 
is a knowledge of both phenomena and 
that which is manifested by its phenomena, 
we have the alternative presented of de- 
scribing, or predicating something about 
that which is not phenomenal, or of hold- 
ing that this ultimate thing is known by 
the phenomena alone. The result is that 
if we even begin to make any assertion, 
such as the ultimate exists, or has force, or 
is permanent, we must, in so far as mate- 
rial substance is concerned, express exist- 
ence, or force, or permanency, in terms of 
that which is phenomenal. If the second 



28 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

alternative be presented, that the substance 
is known only by the phenomena, the hy- 
pothesis of a material substance disappears, 
and we know only that which is phenom- 
enal. 

It is necessary also to notice the funda- 
mental position of Kant, that we know only 
phenomena but do not know that of which 
they are phenomena. It may in this case 
be said that matter is known only in terms 
of mind. If we accept the view that Kant 
maintained, that there was a material world 
behind these modifications, it must be an- 
swered that he asserted that this material 
noumenon is unknown. If we accept the 
view that matter is known only as a modi- 
fication of mind, then there is no way of 
solving the problem which we are consid- 
ering. It need hardly be added that any 
doctrine which, like that of Locke and 
Berkeley, expresses a denial of any material 
substance except the collocation or combi- 
nation of qualities (z. e. phenomena), does 
not raise the question as to the ultimate 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 29 

nature of anything beyond the phenomena 
themselves. 

It must be admitted, then, that a meta- 
physical solution of our problem is not to 
be obtained. Matter is simply what is 
known by the senses, and there can be no 
such thing as material substance in onto- 
logical terms. 

Assuming that the position just reached 
is untenable, it may be well for me to re- 
frain from drawing a general conclusion 
until some other questions be answered. 

2. Is the solution to be found by means 
of physical experiment ? Here we have all 
the data from which our conclusion is to 
be .drawn, lying in the world of phenom- 
ena. We distinguish the phenomena, which 
chemistry erroneously calls substances, as 
solid, liquid, or gaseous. The solid and 
liquid substances are visible and tangible ; 
they may or may not affect the senses of 
smell and taste. The gaseous substance 
as a vapor may or may not be visible or 
odorous ; it is seldom tangible. It is ii) 



jo Some Problems of Philosophy. 

some cases inodorous, intangible, and in- 
visible. In such cases we know it by the 
causes which have produced it, or by both 
causes and effects. The fact that a gas 
is not known to the senses directly does 
not make it a metaphysical substance, no 
matter what the term metaphysical sub- 
stance may mean (unless indeed the con- 
clusions of Locke and Berkeley be regarded 
as valid). It is not so much a question at 
this point whether an experiment or a se- 
ries of experiments will in the future solve 
our problem as to the ultimate nature of 
matter, as it is a question whether experi- 
ment has reached such a conclusion. There 
is no man of reputation in the scientific 
world who has ventured to conclude what 
matter is. Suppose that it be said, " Mat- 
ter in its ultimate form is what is visible 
and tangible/ ' Then does oxygen cease 
to be matter ? Suppose that heat be gen- 
erated from the treatment of visible and 
tangible objects, is heat the essence of 
matter ? In the transformation of one 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 31 

mode of material existence into another 
mode, can it be asserted that one mode is 
more ultimate than another ? Let me ad- 
vance a step farther. Suppose that we 
maintain that our experimental knowledge 
of matter is ultimately a knowledge of mo- 
tion, then it must be asked what is meant 
by motion. Motion must be known or un- 
known to our senses. To each sense it is 
a different appearance. The flash of light 
seems to be the essence of matter, for it is 
a mode of motion ; but the sounds of the 
ear must then be of the essence of matter, 
and the imperishable truth begins to rise 
dimly from our discussion, that the uni- 
verse of which we are sensible is a succes- 
sion or a combination of a great variety, 
which does not lead to the solution of our 
problem. We may produce new phenom- 
ena by physical or chemical experiments, 
but with each new transformation of one 
chemical or physical phenomenon or a 
combination of phenomena, the appear- 
ance of something different beyond that 



32 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

with which we set out throws no light on 
the problem, and in so far as analysis aids 
us, it is quite apparent that, even were the 
recognized substances which chemistry de- 
scribes, or the recognized forces of elec- 
tricity, heat, light, or sound with which the 
science of physics deals, to be made simpler 
than they are now supposed to be, the 
further we should be led away from the 
problem which we are considering. 

It may be urged that one fact is demon- 
strated by each new experiment, and that 
is the fact that whatever is material occu- 
pies space, and that extension (the occupa- 
tion of space) is the essence of all that is 
material. In other words, we ask, would 
there be any matter without the existence, 
space ? I admit at once that such a case 
is altogether inconceivable. It is not to 
solve our problem to advance such a prop- 
osition. It is proper to inquire whether 
space would be if there were no mind, just 
as it is proper to inquire whether there 
would be no matter if there were no space ; 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 33 

and this view of our subject is not far re- 
moved from the negative conclusions which 
I am soon about to draw. It might be 
suggested that if space be a form of intui- 
tion, the dependence of matter on space 
could no longer be asserted. 

3. Is a solution possible by purely log- 
ical process ? Matter in logic is a general 
name, or concept, or idea applicable equally 
to every material thing. If the solution of 
our problem is to be found in an analysis 
of the being of matter in a logical sense, 
we have no need to consider the term mat- 
ter and the ultimate nature of what that 
term implies, in the nominalistic sense. If 
matter be a mere name predicable of any 
one or all of material phenomena, its ulti- 
mate, i. e. non-phenomenal, nature must 
be merely verbal — a phenomenon of lan- 
guage. If the conceptualist doctrine be 
accepted, matter is only a general thought 
which, when analyzed, brings one simply 
to individual phenomena. These phenom- 
ena do not furnish a solution, and if we 



34 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

analyze the concept we simply analyze a 
product of thought and our problem disap- 
pears. There may be said to be two kinds 
of logical realism : the one expressed by 
the phrase universalia ante rem, the other 
by the phrase universalia in re. The for- 
mer is Platonic : the latter is Aristotelian. 
The logical meaning of matter in the Pla- 
tonic realism is ideal, but what is real in 
this sense is not known by the senses. It 
is certain that Plato denied that sensible 
objects were known by the Reason, and if 
the idea of matter is the universal idea of 
all material things, then matter as an idea, 
i. e. as the universal, is not material be- 
cause it is not known by anything but the 
reason. In fact, the " Matter " of the Pla- 
tonic philosophy, in so far as we have to 
consider our main problem, lies beyond our 
reach, for it is ultimate, and, logically, is 
therefore beyond analysis. The universal 
idea of the Aristotelian logic (I am, of 
course, not speaking of Aristotle's doc- 
trine as to the physical structure of mat- 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 35 

ter) cannot be made an object of our pres- 
ent investigation. The idea of matter is 
that which makes material things what 
they are. Without it there would be no 
individual material things ; without the in- 
dividual things, universal matter would not 
be. In the former case we have simply a 
phenomenal problem before us, in the other 
case there is nothing to investigate. 

4. Is the solution of our problem to be 
found in the establishment of a hypothesis 
to agree with material phenomena ? The 
most important hypotheses are : 

1. The Atomic. 

2. The Dynamic. 

1. The Atomic. If matter consists ul- 
timately of atoms, these atoms must be 
either extended or not. If they are ex- 
tended, they must be infinitely divisible or 
not. If they are infinitely divisible, they 
are not atoms. If they are not infinitely 
divisible, then we must ask whether they 
are knowable as atoms or not. If they are 
knowable as atoms, each part of the knowl- 



$6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

edge of them in order to refer to matter 
must be sensible knowledge. Atoms are 
thus either non-existent if they be incapa- 
ble of infinite division (which is inconceiv- 
able), or they are phenomena, and our prob- 
lem is still unsolved. If they are not 
extended they must be either knowable 
or unknowable. But if they are not ex- 
tended their being is inconceivable, and 
hence it cannot be said that they are 
known or unknown. 

2. The Dynamic. Each material phe- 
nomenon may be regarded as a manifesta- 
tion of force. If there be a manifestation 
of force in the material phenomena known, 
such a manifestation must be directly or 
indirectly known. It is plain that force 
cannot be known by one sense nor by a 
plurality of senses. Sensible phenomena, 
as Hume showed, do not give us a knowl- 
edge of force, because they do not give us 
a knowledge of causality ; when it is said 
that the only way in which matter can be 
considered in physics is as a collection or 



Ultimate Nature of Matter. 57 

succession of centres of force, it is not ex- 
plained what force is. And in this case it 
must be told, not what the ultimate nature 
of matter is, but what the ultimate nature 
of force is. If we explain the ultimate 
nature of force in terms of matter, we are 
following a vicious circle and return to our 
original problem. If we explain the ulti- 
mate nature of force in terms of that which 
is non-material, we deny the ultimate ex- 
istence of matter and our problem disap- 
pears. It might be added that the cause 
of this difficulty is, that the idea of force is 
less ultimate than the idea of matter, un- 
less matter be regarded as a modification 
of mind. If the question then be raised, 
what is the cause, or the ultimate nature 
of this modification, our problem disap- 
pears. 

Direct knowledge of force is impossible 
in so far as the senses are concerned. 
Without any suggestion as to the meta- 
physical meaning of the term, it may be 
concluded that if the essence of matter be 



38 Some Problems of Philosophy, 

force, there is no direct knowledge of such 
an essence. If the knowledge of matter as 
force be an indirect knowledge gained by 
inference from facts already known, it is 
necessary that the following truths should 
be set forth. The perception of color, of 
heat, or of sound is not a perception of 
force. If we regard such phenomena as 
manifestations of force, we are obliged to 
refer to the law of causation and to say 
that these phenomena are effects of some 
cause or causes. It is impossible, so far as 
we know, to separate the fact of force and 
the fact of causality. One is not found 
without the other. Wherever there is an 
effect there is a manifestation of force. 
Wherever there is a cause there is an ex- 
ercise of force. 

When therefore we attempt to explain 
matter by referring to force, we are obliged 
to explain force by referring to causality ; 
and in explaining causality we cannot re- 
fer to material phenomena, but are obliged 
to fall back on the a priori law of causality 
which is not given by experience. 



III. 

The Problem of the Origin of Organic Being. 

Organic existence is existence which 
has life. If organic existence is, its origin 
must be either inorganic or organic. If it 
is organic, there is no problem as to the 
origin of organic things except the prob- 
lem of the origin of all existence. If it is 
inorganic, there are only two ways of dis- 
covering whether or not that which is or- 
ganic has come from that whidh is inor- 
ganic. One of these ways is that of ex- 
perience. If experience shows that an 
organism has come from that which is in- 
organic, then it must be shown by experi- 
ence what the difference is between the 
organic and the inorganic. If it be said 
that what is organic has life, it must be 
asked in what respect does that which has 
life differ from that which has not ? Set- 



40 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ting aside the question whether there is a 
difference in degree of development or a 
difference in kind between the plant and 
the animal, one may examine the proposi- 
tion that the plant is distinct from that 
which is inorganic. Empirically consid- 
ered, the plant or the lowest organism 
must differ from that which is organic 
either in structure or in function, or in 
both. The distinction cannot depend on 
structure alone, if we adhere to the method 
of experience. The analysis of an organ- 
ism betrays the fact that the empirical 
method shows the elements of that which 
we call an organism to be inorganic. The 
arrangement of these inorganic elements 
is no essential part of the organic being. 
If, on the other hand, the function of that 
which we call organic differentiates organic 
from inorganic existence, it is not sufficient 
to prove that the function of the inorganic 
is not the same with the function of the 
organic, otherwise the functions of the 
sensitive plant being different from those 



The Origin of Organic Being. 41 

of the dandelion would make it necessary 
to classify those two plants as being quite 
as different in their nature as the oyster is 
from the most productive vegetable. No 
plant has an independent life ; it assimi- 
lates that which is nutritive. If that which 
is nutritive be absent, the plant will not 
grow, but the absence of growth is not an 
exception to the conservation of energy. 
A sand-bar in a river has a growth if it re- 
ceives deposits. If it disappear the depos- 
its vanish, and something else is increased 
by them. If a diamond be put under the 
blow-pipe it ceases to be a diamond. If a 
plant be taken out of the warm sunshine 
and placed in a cellar it will die or undergo 
a radical change of appearance. If it be 
said that the difference between the or- 
ganic and the inorganic is explained from 
the fact that the former is reproductive of 
its kind and the latter is not, an explicit 
meaning must be given to the term repro- 
ductive. We call the oak reproductive 
because the acorns which drop from its 



42 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

branches are seeds of other oaks. We do 
not fail to notice that the existence of the 
acorn is dependent entirely upon the cir- 
cumstances of the oak. It assimilates what 
is nutritive, and the result is the acorn. 
We say that the fact that the oak is alive 
explains the existence of the acorn. If we 
mix nitric acid and glycerine together, and 
a gas is liberated which will put a town 
into ruins, we do not make the reproduc- 
tive power effected by a union of the ele- 
ments a sign of life. The cause of that is, 
that we imagine the oak to generate acorns 
de nihilo because the processes by which it 
grows are less evident than the processes 
by which the combination of certain useful 
substances generate a new natural phe- 
nomenon the effects of which can never 
die. If we appeal to experience in sup- 
port of the proposition that the combina- 
tions of inorganic substances have never 
been known to produce that which is or- 
ganic, we inevitably present an argnmen- 
tum ad ignorantiam, or else we fail to re- 



The Origin of Organic Being. 43 

member that there are certain inorganic 
things which according to experience have 
never been formed from inorganic combi- 
nations. If the position just noticed be 
taken, we must refuse to consider the dia- 
mond or the emerald, which have never 
been manufactured, quite as different from 
what is inorganic as the clover in the field 
or the insect which is bred upon the water. 
But the impossibility of spontaneous gen- 
eration and of manufacturing organisms 
thus far confront every faithful biologist. 

If we turn away from experience to find 
a clue to the separation of the organic and 
inorganic, we find no a priori (in the Kant- 
ian sense) method of reaching a knowl- 
edge of the origin of life. 



IV. 

Some Difficulties connected with any Doctrine 

of the Ego. 

The Ego, or Self, must be either know- 
able or unknowable. In the former case it 
is of course an object of knowledge ; in the 
latter case it cannot be regarded as lying 
within the domain of science. If the Ego, 
or Self, is knowable, it must be an object 
of consciousness, i. e. self-consciousness, or 
an object of knowledge by the senses. If 
the ego, or self, is known by self-conscious- 
ness, it must be either identical with the 
phenomena presented to self-consciousness 
or not. If it is identical with the phenom- 
ena of self-consciousness, it must either 
vary as the phenomena vary or not. If 
it varies with such phenomena, there is 
a plurality of egos or selves before the 
same self-consciousness, which is absurd. 



Doctrine of the Ego. 45 

If it does not vary as the phenomena vary, 
there must be a common object, always 
present to the self-conscious subject. If 
this common object is known by the phe- 
nomena presented to self-consciousness, 
there is a plurality of egos or selves, which 
is. again absurd. If the ego, or self, is not 
known by phenomena, it does not appear, 
and it must be concluded that what does 
not appear is known, which is inconceiv- 
able. If on the other hand the ego is 
known by the senses, there is the gro- 
tesque conclusion that the ego, being a 
sensible object, must have the qualities 
which are inconsistent with its essential 
being as the ego, i. e. it must be concluded 
that knowledge of the ego is a knowledge 
of that which is not the ego, which is ab- 
surd. It may be added that the ego is 
either a part of conscious thought or it is 
not. If it is such a part, then the absence 
of the thought is an absence of the ego, 
which is absurd. If it is not such a part, 
then the ego is unknown. If the ego is 



46 Some Problems of Philosophy. Li x 

unknown, there are no predicates which 
can be applied to it. The difficulty which 
meets us is then as follows : If there is no 
ego there is no conceivable knowledge, 
hence the knowledge in which the ego is 
not an object is impossible without an ego, 
as subject. 



V. 

Unconscious Mental States. 

There seems at first to be a contradic- 
tion between the terms unconscious and 
mental, for our immediate knowledge of 
mental facts is given by consciousness, and 
it is not possible to speak of a conscious- 
ness of unconscious states. Either the 
mind and the facts of consciousness are in- 
terchangeable terms, or there are mental 
states of which we are not conscious. 

It has been shown that what we call self 
is the subject of all our mental states, but 
is not a phenomenon of consciousness. 
Self is the condition of consciousness, and 
the necessary postulate on which the pos- 
sibility of consciousness depends. It does 
not appear with the phenomena ; it does 
not change with the phenomena. It lies 
beyond our immediate consciousness, and 



48 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

so far it lies in the realm of the uncon- 
scious. For it has been shown to be un- 
tenable, that it emerges into consciousness 
with every new phenomenon. From this 
metaphysical view of the subject we may 
turn to the more common view — the psy- 
chological. 

There is a great number of ordinary 
mental phenomena which lead directly to 
the conclusion that there are unconscious 
states and actions of the mind. These 
have been noticed by psychologists, after 
having been discovered by inference. In 
sensations there is shown to be an element 
of which we are not conscious but which 
affects perception. 

In memory unconscious states are essen- 
tial. It is memory which makes experi- 
ence possible, and it is experience which 
to a great extent gives significance to our 
new acts of cognition. But all of our ex- 
perience is not at one time before con- 
sciousness. In order to be of any advan- 
tage to us, the past experience must be 



Unconscious Mental States. 49 

recalled to consciousness. If our thoughts 
are limited to the immediate phenomena of 
consciousness, we must always live in the 
present. But if we can recall past experi- 
ences, these must be already either in the 
mind or out of the mind. If they are not 
in the mind, we can no more recall them 
than we can recall what we have never 
known. It is inconceivable that the mind 
should create them ex nihilo. Even the 
imagination can only combine or construct 
but cannot create. If the past experiences 
are in the mind, however, and yet are not 
before consciousness, it must be concluded 
that the mind is an unconscious possessor 
of that which the memory preserves. It 
becomes conscious of its possessions only 
when the past is recalled. 

The rapidity with which inferences may 
be made without a conscious reference to 
that upon which they depend, e. g. the 
suppressed premise in an enthymeme, may 
be explained by unconscious activity. In- 
termediate steps in an argument which 



$o Some Problems of Philosophy. 

must have been taken if the conclusion is 
valid are not apparent. Unconscious states 
must there have effected conscious states. 
Further illustrations of this point might be 
found in the phenomena of automatic and 
reflex action where there are undoubted 
evidences of mental influence, but where 
no such influence is revealed to conscious- 
ness. 

Assuming that the mental life of a man 
is not confined to those states of which he 
is conscious, interesting questions are at 
once raised both as to the relation of this 
unconscious element to the central nervous 
system and to the activity which we call 
consciousness. 

If the functions of mind may be local- 
ized in the brain, and if mind and brain are 
connected, then it is probable that cerebral 
action produces mental effects of which we 
are unconscious, as well as those of which 
we are conscious. It has not yet been de- 
termined how far these unconscious states 



Unconscious Mental States. 51 

are identical with the physical activity of 
the brain and nervous system. 

If we regard mind and that of which we 
are conscious as interchangeable terms, 
then the mind is simply a shifting succes- 
sion of phenomena without any stable, 
abiding existence. 

It would appear, however, that con- 
sciousness is simply a light which passes 
along the whole field of mental states, 
while only a part of these states is illu- 
mined at one time. It is impossible to 
conceive of unconscious intelligence or un- 
conscious memory or even of unconscious 
volition. But it is impossible to think that 
what we call mind is limited to the suc- 
ceeding moments of conscious existence. 
It is difficult to account for the various 
phases of our conscious mental life if we 
refer only to conscious states in the past. 
It is easy to conclude that beyond the 
series of phenomena which emerge into 
consciousness there is a wide and deep 
source of knowledge lying beyond con- 



52 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

sciousness. The direction of our thoughts 
is largely determined by these influences 
of which we have no immediate knowledge 
but which condition thought, feeling, and 
abiding character. 



VI. 

The Problem of Physiological Psychology. 

The relation of the brain and nervous 
system to mental phenomena raises ques- 
tions of great interest and importance. 
Until a comparatively recent date, psy- 
chologists were wont to regard with sus* 
picion any attempt to explain mental facts 
by means of physiology, and some were 
ready to take the extreme position of Des- 
cartes, that the mind is wholly distinct from 
the material world. This position was nec- 
essary — so the extreme spiritists believed 
— because a dogmatic materialism had 
been the result of investigations in the 
physiology of the brain. But at present 
both of these extreme doctrines have well- 
nigh disappeared from science, and if what 
was once called materialism exists among 
philosophers, it is in a greatly modified 



54 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

form. It is important to look at the pres- 
ent aspect of the science of psychology as 
affected by the results of inquiry into the 
brain and nervous system. It has been 
demonstrated that what is called mind is 
related to the material world by the ner- 
vous system, that the vehicle by means of 
which sensible knowledge is obtained is 
the nerves of the special senses which are 
shown anatomically to connect the organs 
of sense with determinate centres. It has 
been argued that the localization of sen- 
sory functions renders it at least probable 
that higher mental functions should be lo- 
calized in the central nervous system. This 
view has been strengthened by anatomical 
observation, by physiological experiment, 
by the facts of pathology, and by other 
results in the world of natural science. 
While, however, many positive instances 
are to be cited supporting the view that 
mental functions may be localized, there are 
many negative instances throwing doubt 
upon the theory. Without entering ex- 



Problem of Physiological Psychology. 55 

tensively into this important subject I may- 
say that the evidence seems at present to 
favor the opinion that certain cerebral phe- 
nomena correspond to certain mental phe- 
nomena. How far localization can be con- 
firmed is, however, not the point to which I 
would call attention. The question which 
I would ask is this : Supposing that the 
complicated structure of the nervous sys- 
tem were perfectly understood, so that the 
course of nerve fibres could be traced from 
the periphery to their primary or secon- 
dary centres ; suppose that every known 
mental activity could be localized in the 
brain, what would be the effect of such 
knowledge on psychology? It is some- 
times said that psychology is only another 
name for cerebral physiology, and that to 
attain such knowledge as that to which I 
have just referred is to complete the sci- 
ence of the mind. However perfect our 
physiology may be, however, it does not 
call attention to subjective phenomena, and 
even if it be held that our sensations, feel- 



$6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ings, thoughts, volitions, are simply effects 
©f material actions, the science of these ef- 
fects is not covered by physiology. It fol- 
lows, whatever be our view of the meaning 
of nervous phenomena, that mental sci- 
ence has two sides : one the subjective, 
consisting of those phenomena which we 
call non-material, which cannot be ex- 
pressed in terms of matter. This is the 
historic conception of the field of psychol- 
ogy. It is presented with wonderful com- 
pleteness in the works of Aristotle, and 
has made but few advances since his day. 
The other side of mental science is the 
objective side, which includes among other 
phenomena those of the nervous system. 
It is to show the agreement or correspon- 
dence between these two sides that is the 
present problem of psychology. We can- 
not show that the two sides are identical, 
nor can we show how they are connected. 
The connection of mind and brain is ad- 
mitted by almost everybody to be an insol- 
uble mystery. But the progress of psy- 



Problem of Physiological Psychology. 57 

chology undoubtedly leads one in the 
direction of the study of the nervous sys- 
tem. We may revise our classifications of 
mental phenomena, we may discuss at weari- 
some length the nature and scope of our 
mental " faculties ; " we may fight again 
and again the battles of former centuries ; 
but our efforts must necessarily be fruit- 
less until we have learned something more 
of this great and complex structure, the 
actions of which seem so inseparably inter- 
woven with those of our consciousness. 

I can see many ways in which light may 
be shed on psychology by a more thorough 
understanding of the nervous system. But 
this particular field of thought has led 
many into speculations as idle and fanciful 
as those of the much-abused metaphysi- 
cians. It is wiser to keep for the present 
the twofold problem, the induction of the 
subjective facts of consciousness, the in- 
duction of corresponding cerebral and ner- 
vous phenomena, and in proportion as this 
correspondence is found to exist, and is un- 



5# Some Problems of Philosophy. 

folded, we shall be in a position to explain 
more thoroughly the origin and develop- 
ment of our knowledge. 

A peculiar interest belongs to this line 
of inquiry. One cannot overlook the fact 
that the once favorite " empirical " doc- 
trine of the origin of knowledge has been 
abandoned by almost every contemporary 
thinker of any reputation. It has been ad- 
mitted that the experience of the individ- 
ual man cannot per se produce the mature 
knowledge of a mind fully developed. This 
may be due to the fact which is noticed by 
Mr. Herbert Spencer, — the fact that our 
scientific inquiry into the phenomena of 
consciousness cannot take in the data of 
infant years, when first impressions are 
formed. We have to investigate the tree 
and know nothing of the seed from which 
it springs. But in retreating from the old 
empirical position, philosophers have not 
always accepted the a priori or intuitional 
doctrines of their opponents, but have fallen 
back upon the hypothesis of development 



Problem of Physiological Psychology. 59 

to explain that which the experience of the 
individual cannot explain. It has not been 
shown that mind is the result of this pro- 
cess of development. If it should be shown 
that, for example, what we call a priori 
truth is simply the result of repeated ex- 
periences of individuals, transmitted ac- 
cording to the law of heredity from gener- 
ation to generation, there would have to be 
a general revision of the theory of knowl- 
edge. This has not yet been shown to be 
true. Nor has the theory of development 
made it necessary that we should look for 
any origin of mind simpler than conscious- 
ness which has thus far not been analyzed. 
It is a mistake to draw too wide conclu- 
sions, considering how hypothetical our 
premises are in all that concerns the exist- 
ence of mind in the earlier stages of evo- 
lution. But on the other hand it is a more 
serious mistake to overlook the importance 
of inquiry into the physical conditions of 
our mental life, or to allow a fear of " ma- 
terialistic " results to warp our judgment. 



6o Some Problems of Philosophy. 

It is impossible to conceive of matter ex- 
cept as a modification of mind, and dog- 
matic materialism has been left to doctri- 
naires and to certain amateurs in that 
"science " which bears the same relation 
to philosophy that astrology did to astron- 
omy. How far influences of which we are 
not conscious, but which determine our 
mental experience, are dependent on cere- 
bral conditions is a question which sug- 
gests a field for much fruitful inquiry. It 
is right that the psychologist should not 
leave this field entirely to the physiologist, 
but should regard it as supplementary to 
that which is revealed by reflection, and 
by reflection only. 

There are two principal points, then, to 
be kept in view. 

i. The thorough demonstration of the 
theory of localization. 

2. The proving and developing of a cor- 
respondence between psychical and physio- 
logical states and actions. 

The history of philosophy shows a de- 



Problem of Physiological Psychology. 61 

velopment toward this view of the subject. 
Side by side with the advance of purely 
psychological science there has been an 
advance in the investigation of the physio- 
logical conditions or accompaniments of 
mental phenomena. These have often re- 
sulted in materialism. The atomists laid 
down the principles of materialistic psy- 
chology before an attempt had been made 
to classify the phenomena of the mind. 
The speculative psychology of Plato and 
the inductive psychology of Aristotle show 
no development of physiological principles. 
From the closing days of ancient until the 
opening days of modern philosophy, the 
problems of physiological psychology were 
left to a series of speculative materialists, 
whose reasons for the principles which 
they defended were seldom scientific. How 
widely apart the two schools of thought 
were at the beginning of the modern pe- 
riod is well shown in the sharp opposition 
of Gassendi to the spiritualism of Des- 
cartes. The approach of Locke to the ma- 



62 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

terialistic position when he suggested that 
matter might be made to possess a capac- 
ity for thought, led to the crass and un- 
scientific French materialism of the eigh- 
teenth century. In England, Hartley and 
Priestley endeavored to identify mental and 
material modes, but the defective physiol- 
ogy of the former and the defective meta- 
physics of the latter led to indifferent re- 
sults. Until our own time the problem of 
physiological psychology has not been con- 
sidered in its true light. Even so radical a 
thinker as Mill was not impressed with the 
close connection between thought and cer- 
ebral action. But even those who differ 
widely from Mr. Herbert Spencer in meta- 
physics and who find much that is false in 
his scientific conclusions, will admit that 
he has appreciated the problem in its true 
form. It is doubtless dogmatic to assert 
that mental force is simply a transforma- 
tion of physical forces, but whatever defi- 
nition be given to mind or to matter, it is 
well to remember that there are two sets 



Problem of Physiological Psychology. 63 

of entirely different phenomena. A cor- 
respondence may be observed between 
them, and this is the point at which we set 
out. With such a view of the subject, one 
need not be disturbed by the popular ma< 
terialistic literature like that of Biichner. 
In proportion as the importance of physkx 
logical psychology is apprehended, the 
deeper will be the significance of mental 
phenomena. A striking example of this is 
to be found in the writings of the late 
Hermann Lotze, who was fully alive to the 
great importance of this new development 
of psychology. There are two common 
mistakes : one the denunciation of physio- 
logical methods by men who have never 
seen a ganglion cell ; the other, the denun- 
ciation of subjective methods by men who 
have never given an hour to introspection. 
It does not appear to be necessary, how- 
ever, that a knowledge of one set of facts 
should be incompatible with knowledge of 
the other set. A combination of the two 
is the ideal psychology. 



VII. 

Reason in Contradiction to Reason. 

If a certain conclusion be reached which 
appears to the reasoner to be rational, and 
if the contradiction of that conclusion 
seems to the reasoner to be irrational, 
even false, it does not follow that the con- 
tradictory proposition may not be accepted 
if it is supported by an authority which 
may be rationally shown to be superior in 
its dicta to the conclusion which is held to 
be rational. Reason may tell us that 2 ]> 
1. A contradictory statement may be pre- 
sented in which it is affirmed that 2 <^ 1. 
If these are extrinsic reason for belief in 
the latter position, the question is : — 

1. Whether we can believe what is, as 
far as we can know, irrational. 

2. Whether the reason which supports 
directly the proposition 2 ^> 1 is entitled 



Reason in Contradiction to Reason. 65 

to greater weight than the reason which 
ascribes a higher rational value to the au- 
thority which favors the proposition 2 <^ 1. 
The content of the proposition and its 
contradictory is not in question. It is pos- 
sible that it is rational to accept what is 
irrational because it is more rational to 
trust the authority for what is thought to 
be irrational than to place our own reason 
above such an authority. 



VIII. 

The Relation of Belief to Knowledge. 

It is doubtless true that belief, like 
knowledge, is a term which acquires no 
additional meaning if one attempts to de- 
fine it. Nothing is gained, if belief be 
defined as a state or action of the mind. 
If an attempt be made to differentiate be- 
lief from knowledge, so that both terms 
may be distinct from one another, the 
problem which it is proposed to consider is 
presented. An inaccurate use of language 
is one cause of difficulty in solving the 
problem of the difference between belief 
and knowledge. In many cases it is cus- 
tomary to say "we believe " when we may 
properly say "we know ; '- and conversely, 
it may be said that "we know " that which 
we also "believe." For example, we know 
that the sun rose yesterday morning. We 



Relation of Belief to Knowledge. 6j 

must also believe that this happened. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, in this case, 
to point out any difference between our 
knowledge and belief, for it would be ab- 
surd to say, because we believe that the 
event occurred we do not know that it 
occurred, and vice versa. It may be said, 
also, we know that the sun which has risen 
this morning will set this evening, and it 
would not be proper to find fault with that 
use of the word " know." We believe, 
however, that the sun will set. In cases 
like those, the difference between belief 
and knowledge would appear to be one of 
degree rather than kind ; indeed, the two 
terms in such cases might ordinarily be 
regarded as being interchangeable. Credo 
ut intelligam. Intelligo ut credam : these 
phrases are both expressions of truth. I 
know that the sun is shining, but if asked 
why I know it, I must reply, because I be- 
lieve in the veracity of my vision. I be- 
lieve that an eclipse will occur on a certain 
day, because I know that the prediction is 



68 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

made by a great astronomer. Why do I 
only believe in the truth of that which 
gives me knowledge ? Why do I know 
that the prediction is given by a great as- 
tronomer, while what is predicted is only 
an object of belief ? 

It is evidence that one is at this point 
in danger of dealing with a metaphysical 
question so subtle as to be inconsistent 
with the language of the race. It is neces- 
sary, however, that certain distinctions 
should be made. 

Of any event or thing, one of four pred- 
ications may be made. It is actual, it is 
probable, it is possible, it is necessary. If 
we know what is actual or what is neces- 
sary, then it is superfluous to assert that we 
believe what is actual or necessary. Belief 
in this case is a synonym with knowledge : 
for if we say A is B, the proposition is act- 
ual ; but if we only think it probable or 
possible that it is actual, it is plain that its 
actuality is reduced to probability or posr 
sibility. One cannot say, however, that the 



Relation of Belief to Knowledge. 69 

actual is coextensive with that which is 
known or knowable. Can it be said, then, 
that whatever is known is actual ? True 
knowledge of anything implies that the 
thing is actual. A thing may be known to 
be possible. That thing is not to be called 
actual, but if the possibility of its being is 
known, the possibility is actual. Assume 
ing, under the above restrictions, that 
whatever is known is actual, it may be 
asked whether that can be a knowledge of 
that which is probable. It has been con* 
eluded that a belief in that which is known 
to be actual is simply a knowledge of that 
which is actual. It has also been con- 
cluded that there may be a knowledge that 
a thing is possible (or probable, for possi- 
bility in this instance illustrates the ques- 
tion of probability), but so long as a thing 
is merely probable, or possible, can it be 
an object of knowledge? It would seem 
to be true that what might be called a 
knowledge of the probable is in reality a 
belief in the existence of the probable. If 



yo Some Problems of Philosophy. 

I believe that the battle of Waterloo was 
fought, it may be said that the battle was 
actually or probably fought. If I say I 
know that it was actually fought, then, in 
examining the ground of my knowledge, I 
find that what I call an actual event is in 
reality merely a probable event, — not an 
event which is probable in the future, but 
an event which probably occurred in the 
past. It becomes again apparent that our 
knowledge that the event happened and 
our belief that the event happened are 
practically synonymous terms ; our knowl- 
edge may be founded on what we believe, 
or our belief may be founded on what we 
know. It may be well, therefore, at this 
point to look more closely at the nature of 
belief. 

In order to believe that A is B, it is not 
necessary that the proposition should be 
actual. In this case, however, it may be 
said A is probably B, or A may be B. It 
is here that knowledge and belief follow 
different paths. If it be asserted A is B, 



Relation of Belief to Knowledge. 7/ 

it must be known that A is B. If it be 
believed only that A is B, the categorical 
form of the proposition must be aban- 
doned. It is then known that A may be 
B ; but it is believed that A is B. The 
psychological difference between the cog- 
nition and the belief is represented by the 
logical difference between the assertory 
and problematic propositions. Psycholog- 
ically the cognition and belief do not differ, 
unless it be said that they differ in degree ; 
the reasons which lead one to the knowl- 
edge that A may be B are always the 
same with those which lead one to the be- 
lief that A is B. We cannot know that a 
thing may exist without believing that it 
does exist, unless there be a radical differ- 
ence between knowledge and belief, — a 
difference in kind, not in degree. Clearly, 
while we are obliged to believe or know 
that which is presented to us as actual, we 
are not obliged to believe what is merely 
probable. Actuality presents no alterna- 
tives except possibilities. These possibili- 



J2 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ties in any given case are not direct ob- 
jects of belief or knowledge. A cannon 
is fired. I know that it is fired. I believe 
it is, also, but it is possible that the ex- 
plosion might have failed ; this possibil- 
ity need not be considered, however, in 
direct relationship to the question which 
we are considering. Probability involves 
the presentation of alternatives. We are 
not shut up to any one of these alterna- 
tives. It is probable, for example, that a 
man who stakes his money at roulette ha-' 
bitually will leave a large part of his money 
in the gambling - house ; but while this 
probability may be explained to him, he 
still believes that he will win in the end. 
It will be answered that he has no belief, 
that he does not believe that he will win 
or lose, but is simply experimenting : for 
the probability that he will lose is not a 
certainty, and therefore he may win, i. e., 
he believes that an improbable event may 
occur. This is the conclusion which I in- 
tended to reach ; for we are now led to 



Relation of Belief to Knowledge. j$ 

consider another question. Is probability 
the cause of belief ? That which is im- 
probable may occur. Improbable events 
are possible, and it cannot be denied that 
one can believe in the occurrence of a pos- 
sible event, even if such an event be im- 
probable. If it be asked, why does one 
believe that a probable event will occur, 
the answer is, that certain known facts lead 
to that belief. There is the application of 
the Intelligo ut Credam. But where the 
known facts show the occurrence of an 
event to be improbable, must belief follow 
the knowledge of the facts or not ? A 
man may have a perfect knowledge of the 
facts leading him to a correct estimate of 
what is probable ; but disregarding proba- 
bility, knowing that probability is not cer- 
tainty, he may believe that an improbable 
event may possibly happen. Is that event 
probable to him ? His knowledge for the 
most part gives a negative answer. But 
his knowledge certainly tells him that im- 
probable events have happened. Does this 



74 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

latter knowledge differentiate his belief 
from the belief which he would have were 
he to be led by the facts which point to 
the former alternative conclusion ? If we 
say no, then probability, being founded 
upon that which is known, must be neces- 
sarily a standard of belief, and belief in 
the possible makes the possible synony- 
mous, to that extent, with the probable. 
If we say no, the question arises, Can one 
believe that, belief of which is not war- 
ranted by knowledge ? It may be fairly 
concluded that a belief in the occurrence 
of that which is improbable, while it does 
not separate belief from knowledge, pre- 
vents one from asserting that only that 
which is probable can be an object of be- 
lief. One may believe that an improbable 
event is possible. But what is meant by 
possibility ? By what tests shall possibil- 
ity be determined ? Necessity is not anti- 
thetical to possibility. While no necessary 
event is impossible, there are many pos- 
sible events which are not necessary. Act- 



Relation of Belief to Knowledge, 75 

uality and probability are not antithetical 
to possibility. The difficulty is lessened 
by answering the question, Why can there 
be a belief that an event will occur which 
is neither necessary nor actual, nor prob- 
able, but which is possible ? Suppose that 
it be said, whatever is possible is conceiv- 
able, it may still be asked whether it is not 
possible to believe that the inconceivable 
may occur. One answers in the negative. 
But it should be considered that it is pos- 
sible that our conceptions should be so 
limited or defective as to be useless in de- 
ciding the question just put. Why must 
one confine possibilities to the actual con- 
ditions of one's mind ? It is not an extrav- 
agant assertion to say that even the incon- 
ceivable may be possible. The inconceiv- 
able is a dark negation, but that only the 
conceivable is possible is certainly a dog- 
matic assertion. But if a man declares 
that he believes in the inconceivable he is 
not necessarily guilty of an absurdity, for 
we may not be able to conceive of all that 



y6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

which is possible. It must then be asked, 
Can belief go still further, and can one 
believe in the impossible ? This question 
needs no answer. 



IX. 

The Problem of the Human Will. 

If the will is free, it is not conditioned 
by any antecedent motive. If the pres- 
ence or absence of any motive affects the 
action of the will, there is no freedom. If 
two opposing motives, A and B, are viewed 
by him who wills, it must be asked whether 
the absence of A would cause a willing of 
that which is suggested by B, or if the ab- 
sence of B would cause a willing of that 
which is suggested by A ; then, in any 
case, the will is not free. If it be said 
that the individual will may produce an 
effect a or an effect b, indifferently the 
questions arise : — 

i. Have a and b any influence over the 
one who wills ? 

2. Would the absence of a result in the 
willing of the effect b> or vice versa ? 



y8 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

If both propositions are answered, as 
they must be, in the affirmative, then the 
will is not free, but conditioned. 

If it be said that the denial of freedom 
to man justifies the suspension of volition, 
i. e. y the refusal of man to will or not to 
will, the proposition is logically valid. It 
follows, however, from the nature of the 
will as determined by psychology, that it 
is impossible to suspend volition. To will 
not to will is an act of will. Logically we 
conclude that the will must b e? the effect 
of motives. Psychologically we conclude 
that volition cannot be suspended except 
by an act of will, therefore the suspension 
of volition is impossible. It follows that 
we must will. If my meals are set before 
me from day to day, I must will to eat 
them or starve to death. If I say motives 
determine my will to eat or not to eat, 
therefore I will suspend volition, I am 
willing not to will to eat, and I starve to 
death. Therefore I cannot escape the law 
of nature unless I can avoid exercising an 



Problem of the Human Will. yg 

act of will. If the alternative of prevent- 
ing a crime or not preventing it is set be- 
fore me, I may say I will not exercise my 
will to prevent it or not prevent it. I thus 
will not to prevent it and am particeps 
criminis. Therefore I cannot escape from 
the moral law unless I can avoid exercising 
an act of will. One cannot escape volition, 
and the determination of the will does not 
relieve the man who wills from the physi- 
cal or moral consequences of volition. 



X. 

The Immortality of the Soul 

If the soul is, it is either mortal or im- 
mortal. If it is immortal, then it is not 
dependent on the body, for the body after 
death is changed, and may be reduced to 
the form of substances which have no re- 
lation to the soul of man. If the soul is 
immortal, that immortality must be either 
known or unknown. If it is unknown, 
there is no proposition which is proven 
which asserts that the soul survives the 
body. If it is known, it must be known 
either directly or indirectly. If it is known 
directly, there must be a statement from 
the souls which survive the death of the 
body that they still survive. If no such 
statement is forthcoming, it must be con- 
cluded that there is no direct knowledge of 
the immortality of the soul. If it is known 



Immortality of the Soul. 81 

indirectly, it must be by inference. In- 
ference to be valid must be drawn from 
known facts. Physically there are no facts 
which warrant an inference that the decay 
of the body does not involve the extinc- 
tion of the soul. There are no post mor- 
tem facts of science from which an infer- 
ence may be drawn. The inference, how- 
ever, must be made from known or from 
unknown premises. If the premises are 
known, they must be post mortem prem- 
ises, but post mortem premises imply a post 
mortem life, which begs the question. If 
the premises are unknown, there is no 
conclusion. It must be added that all 
moral arguments fail unless Pessimism be 
refuted. It may be asserted, for example, 
that man's life would be incomplete if his 
soul were mortal. The Pessimist asserts 
that it is incomplete. No induction can 
establish the truth of Optimism, for the 
negative instances of evil stand in the way 
of drawing a conclusion ; no induction can 
establish the truth of Pessimism, for the 



82 Some Problems of Philosophy, 

negative instances of good stand in the 
way. The problem of immortality lies 
therefore outside of the circle of theoret- 
ical philosophy. 



XL 

The Feeling of Obligation and Moral 
Knowledge. 

The term " feeling of obligation " is 
used in a broad sense in what follows to in- 
dicate the existence of a fact which is gen- 
erally admitted. This fact is that all men 
in regulating their conduct feel under some 
obligation to do one thing rather than 
another. The inexactness of the expres- 
sion is made necessary in order that the 
position from which we set out may be as 
broad as possible. If there be such a feel- 
ing of obligation, it may be either ulti- 
mate or not. Without pausing to consider 
whether what is pleasurable, or what is 
good, or what is to the advantage of soci- 
ety, or what is in conformity to the prin- 
ciple of right or the will of God, is that 
which we are under obligation to follow, 



84 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

we may ask whether that which we ought 
to do (using ought either in a relative or in 
an absolute sense) is known. It is not suf- 
ficient to assert that we ought always to do 
what is right and ought never to do what 
is wrong. The reason of this insufficiency 
is, generally speaking, twofold. 

1. If nothing but what is right should be 
the ideal of conduct, assuming that invari- 
able right and invariable wrong are terms 
which are unambiguous in theoretical eth- 
ics, certain questions of casuistry present 
themselves which cannot be answered in 
accordance with our theory, without the 
commission of a wrong. Supposing, for 
example, that it is wrong to steal, and sup- 
pose that unless a theft be committed by a 
certain man, his wife will starve and he 
knows it. If he steals he does what is 
wrong, and if he does not steal he kills his 
wife. Even the law of the land does not 
punish him for murder if he refuses to 
steal, and does punish him for theft if he 
steals. If the theft is justified because of 



Obligation and Moral Knowledge. 85 

the results which would follow a refusal 
to steal, then the obligation not to steal is 
not absolute, but depends on the goodness 
or badness of the end for which the theft 
is committed, and our first assumption is in- 
correct. If, on the other hand, the refusal 
to steal is justified, then the obligation to 
refrain from taking human life is not ab- 
solute. It is not, however, the main ob- 
ject of this discussion to raise such well- 
known difficulties as this. 

2. If it be admitted that there is a feel- 
ing of relative or absolute obligation in all 
men, it may be asked whether, assuming, 
as above, that the obligation is to do what 
is right and not to do what is wrong, there 
is an universal knowledge of what is right 
and wrong. This implies that this knowl- 
edge is found in the possession of all men. 
If the Eastern mother throws her child 
into the Ganges or the Eastern widow 
sacrifices her life at her husband's funeral ; 
if the Catholic penitent contracts disease 
in performing penance for sin, and the 



86 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

Catholic priest advises it ; if the clergyman 
of any creed hastens a patient's end by ex- 
citing emotions which interfere with med- 
ical directions ; if the medical man inter- 
feres with the giving of spiritual aid which 
may save the patient's soul, and looks only 
to the question of life and death ; if the 
heathen priest deifies a vice which to the 
Christian is an abomination against the 
God of Christians ; and if all feel under 
obligations to exercise such conduct, — the 
inference is plain. Either our theory that 
there is a knowledge of right and wrong is 
untrue, or there is some perversion of the 
understanding in the instances mentioned 
above. 

The second alternative only need be dis- 
cussed. The knowledge of what is right 
and wrong is either original or it is ac- 
quired. If it is acquired, it cannot be 
maintained that it is universal or uniform, 
for such a view would involve the unifor- 
mity of experience. If it is original, it 
must be either necessary or not. If it is 



Obligation and Moral Knowledge. 8y 

necessary, then there arises a new diffi- 
culty. A necessary truth is one, the oppo- 
site of which cannot be believed ; if moral 
truth is necessary, it follows that no im- 
moral proposition can be believed to be 
true. If, therefore, moral doctrine is ne- 
cessary and original it must be universal. 
All men must know what is right and what 
is wrong. If a man does that which he 
holds to be right, and if his actions are not 
in harmony with other actions supposed to 
be right, it must be concluded that there is 
no determined standard by means of which 
the morality or immorality of actions may 
be judged unless there be a standard which 
is beyond the natural knowledge of moral 
agents. A asserts, for example, that he 
knows the action X to be less obligatory 
than the action Y. B asserts (and this is 
quite conceivable) that the action X is 
more obligatory for A or B than is the ac- 
tion Y. If that be the true statement of a 
case, it follows : i. That ethical knowledge 
is not necessary knowledge. 2. That it is 



88 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

not universal knowledge. If it is not uni- 
versal but is original, it must be explained 
why the original knowledge of A differs 
from the original knowledge of B. The 
alternative presented is this : either A's 
knowledge is unfounded, or B's knowledge 
is unfounded. Ethical knowledge must 
therefore be non-absolute, i. e. must be 
relative, whether the propositions of A be 
true or not. We need not turn to the 
question whether A has received his knowl- 
edge from an authority beyond himself. 
If he has, ethical knowledge ceases to be 
original, and because it is empirical ceases 
to be necessary in the philosophical sense ; 
and as already suggested, because B and A 
do not agree, there is no instance in this 
case of universal knowledge. 

The conclusion need not be extensively 
considered. The only escape from the in- 
ferences reached in what has been said is 
to be found in the proposition that the 
failure of men to agree in their view of a 
moral standard arises from a perversion of 



Obligation and Moral Knowledge. 89 

knowledge, or of feeling or of will. If 
there be a perversion of knowledge, then 
knowledge of right and wrong is not abso- 
lute. One cannot pervert a man so that 
he believes the half to be greater than the 
whole. It may of course be said that he 
does not know which is the half and which 
the whole. That is not essential. It is 
not necessary for a valid mathematical 
judgment as to the relative value of a 
trade dollar and a gold five-dollar piece 
that a man should be able to state which 
is the more valuable. If he regards the 
trade dollar as more valuable, it may be on 
account of its larger size or on account of 
having had a perverted account given him 
as to which of the two has a greater com- 
mercial value. Now that corresponds to a 
moral judgment. It would not be difficult 
to persuade that man that one of the pieces 
is more valuable than the other. Take, 
however, a five-dollar gold coin, cut it in 
two, and ask the lowest barbarian whether 
a half of the mutilated coin is (not is 



go Some Problems of Philosophy. 

worth) less than the whole, there can be 
no perversion of judgment. One of these 
truths is to be regarded as being accidental 
and the other as necessary. Now if it be 
possible to pervert a man in his knowledge 
of right and wrong, it must be concluded 
that such knowledge is not necessary, that 
there is no knowledge of what is necessa- 
rily right or wrong. If, on the contrary, 
necessity be denied to " the feeling of ob- 
ligation," it is evident that the " feeling of 
obligation" is as necessary to one who fol- 
lows the teaching of the Ten Command- 
ments, for example, as to one who denies 
their binding force. To demonstrate that 
a man ought not to do a thing is to imply 
that he ought to do some other thing. 
Hence that there is an obligation is a ne- 
cessary proposition. Hence the knowledge 
of what the obligation is, is not necessary, 
is not absolute, is not original, is not uni- 
versal. 

If there be no knowledge of what is 
right or wrong, it may be asked whether 



Obligation and Moral Knowledge. 91 

the feeling of obligation to do what is right 
and avoid what is wrong is not accompa- 
nied by a feeling which suggests what is 
right or wrong. Feeling depends either 
on what is known or on what is not known. 
In so far as it depends on what is known, 
the objections are applicable which have 
just been urged against ethical knowledge. 
If the feeling that one thing is right and 
another is wrong be dependent on what is 
unknown, then such a feeling cannot be 
shown to have a legitimate foundation ; for 
it cannot be shown to be universal or nec- 
essary, for it cannot be proved that the un- 
known object about which A has a moral 
feeling is the same or must be the same 
with the unknown object about which B 
has a moral feeling. It is impossible to 
pervert a feeling about an object which is 
unknown. If it be said that the will is 
perverted, it must be shown that the mo- 
tives are the source of this perversion, but 
unless motives are dependent on knowl- 
edge and feeling there can be no voli- 



92 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

tion. Having shown that the perversion 
of knowledge and feeling is inconsistent 
with any necessary, universal, or original 
moral standard, I infer that if the will be 
perverted, the conclusion reached is that 
there is a form which we call loosely a 
feeling of obligation ; that there is no mat- 
ter which has an absolute moral claim. 



v 



\ 



XII. 

Is Hedonism Equivalent to Pessimism? 

Pessimism is used here in a relative 
sense — the meaning given to the term 
being, not the theory that the world is the 
worst possible, but that life is an evil, and 
that the end of ethical conduct is not ideally 
good, but practically bad. 

Hedonism teaches that the standard of 
human conduct is the pleasure resulting to 
the human agent. Whatever is pleasura- 
ble is held to be right. It follows that the 
Tightness of an action is dependent upon 
the disposition of the individual man. If 
it be asserted that what is pleasurable to 
the libertine or drunkard in so far as it is 
pleasurable is not moral, Hedonism is in 
so far abandoned. For if one asks why a 
selfish indulgence for the sake of pleasure 
is immoral, no explanation can be given by 



94 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

the Hedonist. It may be said that pru- 
dence should suggest to a person of dis- 
orderly life that the end will be painful 
and therefore immoral. In this case he 
may be called upon to practice self-denial 
for the sake of future pleasure. If, how- 
ever, he prefer immediate pleasure to fu- 
ture pleasure, there is no motive which 
Hedonism can urge to change his view 
except the quantity of the pleasure to be 
enjoyed. But in urging the quantity of a 
remote pleasure as a motive to immediate 
self-denial, it is conceivable that an objec- 
tion like this might be raised. A man 
might say, pleasure is the standard of mo- 
rality ; but to be moral, that is, to gain 
pleasure, one must be immoral, that is, 
avoid immediate pleasure. The rule of 
conduct is Hedonistic only in the end to be 
reached, but the way to that end, the way 
to pleasure, is not Hedonistic. One must 
be immoral in order to be moral. The 
rule of conduct is not in harmony with the 
motive of conduct. The practical result 



Is Hedonism Equivalent to Pessimism ? 95 

of Hedonism must then be apparent. If 
it is right or expedient or justifiable to be 
moral, then pleasure must be the ideal or 
standard of every voluntary action. It is 
plain, however, both in theory and prac- 
tice, that the pursuit of pleasure will be 
carried out differently by different men. 

There are two general commandments 
given from the Sinai of Hedonism. 

1. Deny yourself, that you may be hap- 
py. 2. Indulge yourself, that you may be 
happy. 

Obedience to the first of these is in 
practice a virtual rejection of Hedonistic 
Ethics. True Hedonism is obedience to 
the second. It is conceivable that a Chris- 
tian might indulge himself in intoxicating 
liquors so as to be able to nerve himself 
for the taking of monastic vows. It would 
be difficult to defend such Christianity. 
Such a man would be a true Christian in 
the same sense in which a self-denying 
pleasure-seeker would be a true Hedonist. 
The true Hedonist is looking always for 



g6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

pleasure. "To-morrow we die," is the 
motive of conduct. There is a sufficiency 
of brothels and of asylums and of hospitals 
and of prisons and of scaffolds and of 
tombs to answer the question with which 
our discussion began. 



XIII. 

The Ethical Conflict. 

Human conduct is determined by two 
influences which are sometimes in har- 
mony but more often in conflict with one 
another. One of these influences is the 
series of natural motives which determine 
the action of the will. The other is the 
series of what one may call ethical mo- 
tives. Natural motives are effective be- 
cause they appeal to appetites or desires. 
Whatever be one's view of the meaning of 
morality, if one believes in the existence of 
moral conduct at all, it must be admitted 
that the motives to morality are often in 
conflict with those of our natural desires. 
Where a course of action is adopted which 
is in opposition to our desires and yet is 
moral, we are accustomed to describe the 
action as self-denial* and to put in antith- 



g8 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

esis the gratification of our desires. Sup- 
pose that if I do a wrong to my neighbor I 
satisfy certain desires effectively, and that 
I refrain from doing a wrong because of 
some moral principle. My refraining may 
be prompted by a fear of the legal conse- 
quences of my action. It is not an act of 
self-denial, but of self-interest. I may re- 
frain because I am too tender-hearted to 
do the wrong action ; in this case there is 
no self-denial. If I refrain because I pre- 
fer to go contrary to my own desire rather 
than to do injury to another, that prefer- 
ence is itself a wish, and unless that wish 
is stronger than my wish to do an injury, I 
will do that which I wish for the most. In 
that case there is no self-denial. Where- 
ever, then, the consequences of our action 
are the standard of morality, self-denial is 
impossible. Wherever our disposition is 
such that injury done to another is more 
painful to us than the sacrifice of our own 
desires, there is no self-denial. Self-denial 
in these cases is only another name for ful- 



The Ethical Conflict. gg 

filling a wish which is stronger tham our 
ordinary wishes or is used figuratively be- 
cause of an ambiguity in the term wish or 
desire. A desire to benefit another at the 
risk of discomfort to himself is so keen in 
a benevolent man that he would regard 
the selfish act as really the act of self-de- 
nial. For, strictly speaking, no man ever 
wills to do that which he does not desire 
to do. The reason why we are accustomed 
to believe the contrary is that men's nat- 
ural desires are in the vast majority of 
cases the same, and in the long run the 
natural desires of the individual man are 
constant. A desire which is uncommon, 
which does not harmonize with the average 
tendencies of men, is looked upon as psy- 
chologically as well as ethically different 
to the desires which we call natural. 

Even if we take as an example the case 
of a man who refrains from doing what he 
" desires ' ' to do because he believes it to 
be contrary to the will of God, the motive 
of his abstinence is a desire to obey God, 



wo Some Problems of Philosophy. 

and this desire is stronger than the desire 
to gain the pleasure consequent on doing a 
wrong. The pleasure to him of obeying 
God is greater than that of disobeying 
him. We have here nothing to do with 
the question as to which is the loftier 
pleasure, which the more moral desire, but 
which is the intenser pleasure, the more 
effective desire. It all depends on what 
meaning be given to the word desire. 

The necessity of religion may be best 
shown from the fact that it furnishes a 
motive for willing that which is usually 
regarded as undesirable. Asceticism is a 
great example of this. There is no system 
of sensualism which has had so powerful 
and constant an influence on men's desires 
as has the teaching that the negation of 
all desires is the thing most desirable. 
The devotees of Christian asceticism seem 
never to experience such exaltation as 
when dwelling upon the crucifixion of the 
desires and lusts which belong to our com- 
mon humanity. It would appear, then, 



The Ethical Conflict ioi 

that the ambiguity of the terms desire and 
desirable occasions the difficulty which has 
been raised. One is led to confound what 
is pleasurable and what is desirable. When 
what is not pleasurable is desired, we speak 
of self-denial. But there may be an objec- 
tion urged that nothing but what is pleasur- 
able is desirable, and that in the case of the 
ascetic the abstinence from satisfying cer- 
tain desires is itself pleasurable, its pleas- 
urable quality depending on a peculiar sub- 
jective condition. I may say it is a pleasure 
to satisfy hunger, to assuage my thirst. I 
am both hungry and thirsty, but choose to 
forego the pleasure of eating and drinking, 
and why ? It cannot be because I find the 
sensations of hunger and thirst agreeable. 
But it may be because there are desires 
differing in quality from the desire for food 
and drink, — a desire to perform a meritori- 
ous action, a desire to acquire self-control, 
— the satisfaction of which, in opposition 
to the demands of appetite, gives me the 
greater pleasure. In this case self-denial 



102 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

means simply the gratification of a higher 
desire. Is it conceivable, it may be asked, 
that a man will perform an act which he 
does not desire to perform ? It is not con- 
ceivable, for we always will according to 
our choice, and choice is simply deciding 
that one course of action is more to be de- 
sired than another. Is it conceivable, then, 
that a man should desire to perform and 
should so perform the more painful of two 
actions ? It is only conceivable in case the 
more painful action is judged to be the 
conducive to future happiness. 

It is to be remembered, however, that 
pleasure and pain are in no sense standards 
of ethical conduct. If there be truly right 
action, it is followed, not because it is pleas- 
urable, but because it is right, and the high- 
est morality consists in desiring to do what 
is right, irrespective of the pleasure or pain 
involved. This does not conflict with the 
view that what is moral is in the end that 
which is the most pleasurable. But sup- 
pose it be denied that the most pleasurable 



The Ethical Conflict. 103 

course of action is the most moral course, 
why should one be moral ? There is no 
answer to this question except the reli- 
gious answer. 



XIV. 

The Doctrine of a First Cause. 

The question, is there a first cause, has 
both a philosophical and a theological im- 
portance. In one case it is related to the 
problem of the origin of all natural phe- 
nomena ; in the other case it is related to 
the Theistic arguments. If the reality of 
causation be disputed, there is no first 
cause. It is intended in what follows to 
assume that causation is a reality and then 
to consider the propositions which may be 
advanced with reference to the possible, 
probable, or actual being of a first cause, 
and to endeavor to form some conclusion 
as to the nature of such a cause in case it 
should be said to exist. 

There are various ways in which the 
conclusion is reached : there is a first cause. 
Some of these ways need only be stated 



The Doctrine of a First Cause. 105 

without extended discussion. Sometimes 
the affirmation is made as a deduction from 
the proposition that there is a God, but the 
existence of God as an object of belief de- 
pends on the principle of causality, and 
unless it be held that our belief in God is 
independent of his revealed actions, such a 
deduction as that referred to must be re- 
garded as invalid. It would appear to be 
inconceivable that the being of God as God 
could be reached without the aid of the 
principle of causality. For if such a de- 
duction were possible it would result in the 
affirmation that a Being exists who pro- 
duces no effects. 

Sometimes it is affirmed that the mind 
is not content with the contemplation of 
secondary causes ; that it can only be sat- 
isfied in resting ultimately upon a belief in 
the existence of a first cause. But that 
this belief is satisfactory, even assuming 
that it is universally satisfactory, does not 
mean that it is scientifically justifiable, un- 
less its satisfactory character depend on 



106 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

revelation. There are several aspects to 
this question. We say the universe ex- 
ists, therefore it must have been made, 
and the ultimate, i. e. the first cause of the 
making of the universe is God. The Bible 
tells us distinctly that God did make the 
universe ; but does science tell us that God 
made the universe ? It is evident that a 
negative answer to the latter question is 
not necessarily connected with the Biblical 
doctrine. It does not follow that because 
natural facts do not lead us to the infer- 
ence that God made the universe, a super- 
natural revelation may not be made lead- 
ing to a contrary conclusion. 

But it is by no means established that 
the doctrine of a first cause and the doc- 
trine that God made the universe are in- 
separably connected. It is possible to deny 
the conceivability of a first cause ; it is 
even possible to deny the possibility of be- 
lief in a first cause (using cause in a scien- 
tific sense) without denying that an Infi- 
nite God is cause of all that we know. 



The Doctrine of a First Cause, wy 

The simplicity of the law of causation is 
the clue to be followed in reaching that 
conclusion which at first sight seems to be 
so paradoxical. As we have assumed that 
causation is a reality, it is not necessary 
that the doctrine of Hume should be dis- 
cussed : that causality is a matter of expe- 
rience and cannot be shown to be appli- 
cable with respect to events of which there 
has been no experience. Those who dis- 
pute the doctrine that there is a first cause 
take one or more of the following posi- 
tions : 

i. There is no first cause, for Nature is 
self-existent ; it cannot be shown that mat- 
ter has a beginning ; it cannot be shown, 
therefore, that matter is an effect. If mat- 
ter is not an effect, it is not caused. There 
is, therefore, no first cause. The conclu- 
sion is atheistic. 

2. There is no first cause, for even as- 
suming that matter is self -existent and that 
the arrangement of matter in forms of in- 
organic and organic existence is due to a 



io8 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

Deux ex machina, even assuming that mind 
has been introduced as something above 
and beyond matter ; even assuming that a 
Supreme Architect may have fashioned the 
already existing matter so as to reach cer- 
tain ends, a difficulty is at once apparent. 
This difficulty is to be found in what is 
often called the " Infinite Series. ,, 

The first of these positions is one which 
has often caused great difficulty. It is af- 
firmed that " creation ex nihilo " is incon- 
ceivable. It is not a question of an infinite 
series in this case. Can one believe that 
something comes from nothing ; i. e. can 
one believe that matter is not eternal or 
that mind has not always existed ? But 
what is the meaning, it may be asked, of 
such inquiries as these ? This is a point 
at which the simple, the very simple law 
of causality may be applied. An effect is 
that which begins to be. A cause is that 
without which a thing would not begin to 
be. What we call matter has never been 
known to begin to be, but what we call 



The Doctrine of a First Cause, log 

matter is a series of effects. Where there 
is no knowable effect there is no matter ; 
uncaused material phenomena are incon- 
ceivable. 

It is necessary, then, that one should as- 
sume that the regressus of material effects 
is infinitely material. Matter as we know 
it is simply a constant, uniform series of 
modifications of the mind. Is the series of 
mental modifications eternal ? Has the 
mind never begun to be ? It must be con- 
eluded that matter, except as a modifica- 
tion of mind, is inconceivable, in which 
case the problem as to the beginning of 
matter must be either a problem as to that 
which causes the modifications of mind, or 
a problem as to the origin of mind itself. 
But mind does begin to be. There is no 
continuity between the minds of A, B, and 
C, analogous to the continuity which may 
be observed between the spring weather 
and the revival of vegetable life. Mind, 
or rather minds, and the modification of 
minds, are events which point backward. 



no Some Problems of Philosophy. 

The index finger is the law of causality. 
Where does the series of causes end ? 

The first position is evidently merged in 
the second. Every effect must have a 
cause, and as the effect points to a cause, 
in considering the cause we find an effect 
and may proceed in this way finding the 
causes of effects to be the effects in their 
turn of other causes. One cannot rest on 
anything knowable without knowing that 
that thing is a change, and one is thus 
necessarily forced to proceed, or rather to 
go back, pressed by the principle of causa- 
tion until these changes grow dim and 
more dim, until an infinite series of causes 
and effects is suggested. What is this in- 
finite series ? To say that it is an effect 
of matter is to say that without mind the 
series of mental modifications would still 
continue. To say that it is mind, is to say 
that there is a causal relationship between 
mind and mind, which is inconceivable. 

It is at this point that the real Theism 
of Atheism begins to be manifested, demon- 



The Doctrine of a First Cause. m 

strating the infinite character of God by 
the finite character of Nature. The infinite 
series of causes which baffle our knowledge 
and imagination when what we call matter 
and the finite mind are left behind, is noth- 
ing more nor less than the resources of a 
Nature, or a Force, or a Something, which 
we call God. To the Pessimist he may be 
an evil spirit ; to the Agnostic, an algebraic 
x ; to the Christian this infinite series be- 
comes a living and intelligent Power. This 
backward and apparently atheistic journey 
leads us at last to the contemplation of 
God's chief attribute. The faint lights are 
extinguished one by one and darkness is 
expected, but an unexpected light appears 
a long way off and the lesser lights are 
needed no more. 



XV. 

The Infinite. 

It is not intended in the short discussion 
which follows to do more than to point out 
certain conclusions which may be reached 
with respect to this important metaphys- 
ical question. The adjective infinite may 
be applied to more than one being. It 
may be said Space is infinite ; time is 
infinite ; God is infinite. It may be also 
said God's attributes are infinite ; he is in- 
finitely holy or benevolent or powerful. 
The term infinite is ambiguous. Literally 
there is no conceivable infinite being of 
which we can think unless it be God him- 
self who is regarded as truly infinite. For 
example, when we say that space is infi- 
nite, it is meant that there are no bounds 
to space ; but still this is only to assert that 
space as space is infinite. It has no bounds 



The Infinite. 113 

in so far as its extensiveness is considered, 
but it has limits. It is finite in so far as 
dimensions are concerned, if we adhere to 
what is conceivable. It is finite in the 
forms which it can assume ; it is limited, in 
a word, to being space. In every case 
where infinite is made a predicate, the 
relativity of that predicate is apparent. 
The subject is said to be infinite in its 
kind, but not absolutely infinite. Noticing 
this restriction, one may ask what we mean 
by infinity, and a consideration of one or 
two examples may help to answer the 
question. Take the proposition just re- 
ferred to : Space is infinite. This does not 
mean that Space has no bounds of any 
kind. To be anything conceivable, a thing 
must not be something else. It is this 
which makes the term infinite as applied 
to space a relative term. But we may say 
space is infinitely extended. Extension is 
ordinarily applied to objects which fill 
space, but it may be said of space itself 
that its extension has no limits. Starting 



/ 14 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

from any given point of space, we can 
neither empirically nor non - empirically, 
neither by imagination nor thought, reach 
any point where Space ends except under 
the restriction mentioned above. It is not 
meant, however, that the man who thus 
views Space is like the man who views a 
vast prairie or desert. Immensity and in- 
finity are not synonymous terms. Take 
the proposition : God's power is infinite. 
This does not mean that God's power is 
infinite except as power. God's power is 
not infinitely spatial, just as Space is not 
infinitely powerful. The two kinds of in- 
finite existences are not inconsistent with 
each other. 

Assuming that a difficulty, however 
great, is present, infinite power can over- 
come the difficulty, unless the difficulty be 
infinite. If the difficulty be infinitely 
great, the doctrine that there is anything 
infinitely powerful may of course be aban- 
doned. With these few introductory ob- 
servations, let us now consider the validity 



The Infinite. 115 

or invalidity of the following proposi- 
tions : — 

1. There is something which is infinite. 

2. There is something which is infinite, 
and that something cannot be known. 

3. There is something which is infinite, 
and there may be belief in the existence of 
that infinite something. 

4. There is something which is infinite, 
and that something may be inadequately, 
though not fully, known. 

5. There is something which is infinite, 
and that something is known and known 
as infinite. 

These various propositions do not pre- 
sent a logical division of the various forms 
in which the doctrine of the infinite may 
be stated. They exhaust all of the pos- 
sible alternatives, but the defective logical 
arrangement is necessary so that certain 
distinctions may be more apparent. 

It is plain that there is no empirical 
knowledge of that which is infinite, for 
human experience is finite. It is equally 



n6 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

plain that there exists a belief in that 
which is infinite, and if one believes in the 
existence of that which is infinite, it ought 
to follow that the meaning of the term 
infinite is known. Before any of the prop- 
ositions just advanced can be considered, it 
must be asked whether the Infinite is con- 
ceivable or not. It may for the moment 
be admitted that there is no Infinite, or 
that we do not know whether there is an 
Infinite being of any kind or not. This 
admission does not carry with it the incon- 
ceivability of the Infinite. 

It may seem presumptuous to assert that 
the test of the validity of the propositions 
noticed above may be found in a definition 
in a few words of Infinity. Infinite or In- 
finity — these terms are negative. If we 
say that anything is infinite, we must make 
the term negative or abandon our propo- 
sition. Non-finite is that which is either 
infinite or nothing. It can be shown that 
infinity is not nonentity. Is Infinity, then, 
a positive quality ? Is there a positive in- 



The Infinite. ny 

finite known to the human mind ? It seems 
to me that there is no knowledge of a 
positive infinite, otherwise such knowl- 
edge would be infinite knowledge requir- 
ing either infinite time or an infinite mind. 
What we call a knowledge of the infinite is 
a knowledge of something potential, not 
actual, which we express in negative terms. 
We are obliged to hold that there is some- 
thing which is infinite, for we can never 
reach limits beyond which something does 
not lie either in fact or in thought. The 
nature of our knowledge has been shown 
to be negative, not positive, so that a 
knowledge of immensity is not more a 
knowledge of Infinity than is our knowl- 
edge of a grain of sand 



XVI. 

God and the Principle of "Right." 

If it be held that there is a God, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the in- 
ference that there is an absolute principle 
of Right. Conversely it may be said that 
to assert the existence of an absolute right 
is to lead one to the conclusion that there 
is a God. If there be a God and if there 
be an absolute right, it may be asked, what 
is the relation between God and this prin- 
ciple ? This may be said to be a matter of 
mere speculation. Is that which is right 
to be called right because of its intrinsic 
" Tightness, " or is it right because it is 
conformable to the Will of God ? It is not 
necessary in considering this alternative to 
affirm or deny that there is a knowledge of 
an absolute right in the possession of men. 
It is simply a question as to whether God 



God and the Principle of "Right." 119 

could, if he would, will what is not Right. 
If it be said that the principle of right is 
that which determines the Will of God, we 
not only limit the absolute supremacy of 
God, but we virtually create a Superior 
God, an abstract principle, or a concrete 
rule which is without a person to create it 
or enforce it. It may be affirmed, how- 
ever, that the will of God is that which 
creates Right. In this case it is impossible 
that God should will what is wrong. The 
fact that God wills a thing insures its 
Tightness. If it be objected that it would 
be wrong for God to will an immoral ac- 
tion, it may be said that : 1. The willing 
of such an action on the part of God would 
take away its immoral quality. 2. That 
the absolute will of God makes right as 
absolute as his will, and the unchangeable 
character of God guarantees the unchange- 
able character of the principle of right. It 
would then follow that God could make 
Right wrong and Wrong right if he would, 
but that he would not. This view is avoided 



i2o Some Problems of Philosophy. 

by some who likewise reject the theory 
that God's will is determined by an abso- 
lute principle of right. It is then sug- 
gested that God's will is determined by the 
Holiness of his Nature. In this case we 
have simply a new form of the old teach- 
ing, for we are obliged to ask what de- 
termines the Holiness of his Nature. If 
we say his own will (and we should say this 
if we believe in Omnipotence) we must 
conclude that what is right is dependent 
on the will of God. If we assert that the 
Holiness of God conditions his will, we 
must conclude that the essence of Holi- 
ness is independent on the Divine volition, 
and that God must will according to the 
principle of Holiness which elevates that 
principle to supremacy and dethrones the 
Deity. It might be added that a vindica- 
tion for the actions of what is called Prov- 
idence may be found in this, and that if 
God has given Himself to Man, it need 
not be a matter of doubt that Man should 
assent to all volitions of God, when those 
volitions are revealed. 



XVII. 

The Atheistic Meaning of Pantheism. 

If the universe is, it must be either ma- 
terial or ideal, or both. If the universe is 
identical with God, God must be material, 
ideal, or both. If God and matter are 
identical, then the terms God and matter 
are interchangeable. Matter is then the 
only being ; the result is Atheism. If God 
and the ideal, i. e. the spiritual, are identi- 
cal, then the ideal world of human person- 
ality is a part of a phenomenon of God. 
The existence of human persons with con- 
flicting purposes cannot be explained with- 
out asserting that there is opposition be- 
tween the parts of God, i. e. a plurality of 
principles. If there is a plurality of prin- 
ciples, the hypothesis of Pantheism fails, 
for Pantheism affirms that there is but one 
principle. There must be, therefore, either 



122 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

no God, which is Atheism, or there must 
be a plurality of principles, which is not 
Pantheism. If the universe, i. e. God, is 
both material and ideal, then in so far as 
God is material, the objection urged as to 
materialistic Pantheism is applicable ; and 
in so far as God is ideal the objection 
urged against idealistic Pantheism is appli- 
cable. Therefore if the only God be the 
universe, there is no God. 



XVIII. 

The Doctrine of Cause and Effect 

One might reasonably demand a defi- 
nition of the terms now to be discussed. 
A definition given at the outset would be 
likely to beg the question to be consid- 
ered. The terms " cause ' and " effect ' 
are equivocal, and it is perhaps better to 
look at them in a broad popular way before 
attempting any philosophical treatment of 
them. The ordinary laborer understands 
to some extent the meaning of these words 
when he tells you that death is an effect of 
disease or fire the cause of heat, but the 
concrete example is not a definition, nor 
is a definition a philosophical explanation. 
One may have an idea that cause is that 
which brings to pass some event without 
realizing what is involved in the term 
"bringing to pass," or in the term " event." 



124 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

It is proposed to examine this sub- 
ject : — 

i. Historically — in order to determine 
what opinions have been held with refer- 
ence to it. 

2. Critically — in order, if possible, to 
point out defects in such opinions. 

3. To set forth briefly, not a complete 
theory of cause and effect, but only cer- 
tain principles which seem to me to be in- 
volved in the solution of this most difficult 
problem. Without entering the mysteri- 
ous realm of Eastern thought, I shall no- 
tice first the more important allusions to 
the subject of cause or effect in Greek phi- 
losophy. Theories upon causation may be 
divided as follows : — 

A theory of cause and effect is : — 

1. Dogmatic. <z. Empirical, b. A priori, 

2. Skeptical. 

3. Critical. 

As will be seen from this division, the 
dogmatic theory may be either empirical 
or a priori. I may add that the skeptical 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 125 

theory is always empirical, while the crit- 
ical theory is a priori. In case there 
should be some fault found with the com- 
bination of the words dogmatic and a pri- 
ori, I would say that I use the term a pri- 
ori simply in the negative sense ; applied 
to that which is not the result of pure ex- 
perience. 

Those who discussed the theory of cause 
in the period of Greek philosophy usually 
took the dogmatic-empirical view. The 
fact that causes and effects existed was 
observed, but was not considered in the 
first instance as anything requiring ex- 
planation. It was a thing belonging to 
the universe. 

The Atomists, for example, in support- 
ing the doctrine that everything that hap- 
pens happens necessarily, regarded the 
necessity of that happening as a necessity 
of the universe ; not as a necessity of per- 
ception or thought. Plato fails to notice 
cause in its relations to thought, but points 
out certain facts which show his general 



126 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

theory of the subject. In the Hippias 
Major he makes Socrates ask the ques- 
tion, " Is there anything which effects any- 
thing excepting cause ? " In the Euthy- 
phron he points out by an example the 
priority of the cause to the effect, where he 
says : " A thing is not beloved by the gods 
because it is holy, but is holy because it is 
beloved by the gods." In the Timceus a 
distinction is drawn between a necessary 
cause and a divine cause, and Necessity is 
viewed by Plato as a loose kind of cause, 
which is itself uncaused. In the Pkcedo, 
Socrates is made to discuss the nature of 
cause, and three points of view are there 
presented : the physical cause, such as the 
eating and drinking which assist in the 
growth of a man. With this, Plato is not 
satisfied, nor is he content with that kind 
of cause which was introduced by Anax- 
agoras, i. e. y the theory of supernatural 
agency. The Phcedo brings out, however, 
not only an interesting view of the Pla- 
tonic Idea, but also an interesting view of 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 127 

Plato's doctrine of causation. The idea is 
that which makes a thing what it is. The 
phenomenal world changes because it is 
participating in the noumenal world of 
ideas. A thing is beautiful because it is in 
reality an effect of the Idea of Beauty ; it 
is great because it participates in great- 
ness. The change which is incident in 
what one calls an effect is in reality only 
successive phenomena of various eternal 
ideas. This very imperfect view of cause 
is rendered still more imperfect by the dif- 
ficulty which attends an understanding of 
what Plato's view was as to the MtOigi* of 
the phenomenal with the Ideal or Noume- 
nal world. Still the discussions which I 
have briefly alluded to are almost the first 
words upon causation which we find in 
Greek Thought. Plutarch tells us that this 
subject was discussed in the house of Peri- 
cles, but with what result we do not know. 
Passing over certain vague allusions in 
the works of the Academicians, one finds 
a remarkable reference to cause in the 



128 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

Philosophy of Aristotle, who seems to have 
interpreted the search after the apxrj in the 
pre-Socratic period as a search after the 
cause of the universe. The Ionians had 
looked for the to cfoi), the Pythagoreans for 
the formal cause, Empedocles and Anaxag- 
oras had emphasized the efficient cause or 
causes, and Socrates, looking at the uni- 
verse teleologically, had recognized the 
final cause. Aristotle grouped all of these 
under the heads of Matter and Form. He 
saw that the being acted upon was a cause 
of the effect which followed when that be- 
ing was acted upon. He saw that the 
mode of the action of causa efficiens was a 
condition of the action itself, and therefore 
a cause ; and in pointing out the end of 
the action he rose beyond the anthropo- 
morphic doctrine of Socrates and identified 
ultimately the First and the Final Cause. 
The theory of Aristotle is perhaps the 
most complete one before the Philosophy 
of the eighteenth century. This fourfold 
division of cause pervaded all the later 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. I2g 

thought down to the beginning of modern 
philosophy. Like many of Aristotle's doc- 
trines, it was incorporated in the language 
and in the practical teaching of the civil- 
ized world. The Epicureans returned to 
the Atomic conception of the universe, and 
Lucretius pauses to notice the reign of 
necessity and of law in the universe and 
the uniformity of causation. The Stoics 
did not emphasize the doctrine ; they were 
content to revert to Matter and to God as 
the conditions of Being and of Change. 
The Skeptics seem to have regarded the 
notion of cause with contempt. In his 
work Adversus Matkematicos, Sextus Em- 
piricus tells how the Skeptics regarded the 
problem. The statement is interesting 
and important. A cause is relative, for it 
implies an effect, but the relative is not. 
If the cause comes with the effect, they 
cannot be distinguished from one another. 
If the cause precedes the effect, it cannot 
be a cause ; for it is only cause after the 
effect is produced, and it is absurd to say 



ijo Some Problems of Philosophy. 

that it follows the effect. In the works 
of St. Augustine we find the recognition 
of cause, and a Platonic treatment of the 
subject. Causes are fortuitous, natural, or 
voluntary ; but the cause of causes is God. 
All good things come from the goodness 
of God. Evil things come from the priva- 
tion of God's goodness. The scholastic 
philosophy was so largely influenced by 
Aristotle that one looks for the reproduc- 
tion of the four causes in the works of 
their representatives. 

Prior to the time when the Aristotelian 
philosophy was revived by the Moorish and 
Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages we 
find the general subject of causation treated 
of, although unsatisfactorily, in the works 
of some among the earlier schoolmen. In 
the third chapter of his Monologium we 
find Anselm discussing in a Platonic man- 
ner what that certain nature may be by 
which whatever thing is, what it is (Quod 
sit quaedam natura per quam est quicquid 
est), and showing that anything which is 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 131 

what it is by virtue of nothing is itself 
nothing ; and this fact seems to indicate 
the presence in his mind of what after all 
will be found to be the philosophical es- 
sence of cause as such. There is with 
Anselm, as with others of the schoolmen, 
a tendency to fall back on the efficiency of 
the will of God as the principle of causa- 
tion. The similarity of this view with that 
of Augustine cannot fail to be noticed. In 
the work of the latter, De Civitate Dei, xii. 
25, the bearing of fruit by the plant is 
ascribed to the direct agency of God, with 
the quotation, " Neither is he that planteth 
anything, nor he that watereth, but God 
that giveth the increase." From this view 
Abelard dissents in his work on the omnip- 
otence of God, where he carefully distin- 
guishes the act of creation from Nature, 
which is the active, perfected, created be- 
ing. In the works of the Cordova philoso- 
pher Averroes may be found an elabo- 
ration of the Aristotelian metaphysical 
doctrine as to the relation of potentiality 



i $2 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

to reality, which is indeed a species of cau- 
sal relation. The transition from potenti- 
ality to reality was accomplished, accord- 
ing to Aristotle, by motion ; and God, who 
was the source of motion, was himself un- 
moved. According to Averroes the forms 
lie in the matter itself. Albert the Great 
reduced the four causes of Aristotle from a 
single principle : material and formal causes 
become causa intrinseca, efficient, and final 
causa extrinseca ; these lead us back to the 
esse, or form. This esse, however, is only a 
general cause quo aliquid est, and Albert 
adds that there is also existentia, or the 
cause quo aliquid est hoc. This doctrine 
of the schoolman, which really involved the 
whole much ridiculed question as to entity 
and quiddity, seems to me to signify the 
presence of a difficulty as to the real es- 
sence of the principles under considera- 
tion. 

In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aqui- 
nas, working rather within the lines of Ar- 
istotle and of scholastic theology, sheds 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 133 

but little light upon our problem, but by 
his distinction between the various kinds 
of causes shows different sides of the cau- 
sal principle. Out of the more than one 
hundred allusions to the subject in his 
comprehensive work, I may mention some 
of his statements. A cause is that which 
is necessarily followed by an effect. Cause 
is duplex in its nature (22 q., 94, 4, o.), 
causa dispositiva and consummativa. These 
are used, however, in relation to problems 
of theology as to the dealings of God with 
man. An effect is like that which causes 
it, but not like the means or instrument 
which brings it to pass. The operation of 
second causes is always founded on the op- 
eration of first cause, and presupposes it. 
This is a fair specimen of the scholastic 
discussion of the subject. I notice it 
chiefly because it illustrates how little the 
schoolmen grasped the real difficulties of 
the subject. There is one impressive fact, 
however, common to both patristic and 
scholastic thought, — the tendency to em- 



ij4 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

phasize the power of God as exhibited in 
the causes and eff ects of the universe. I 
am disposed to think that this idea was so 
strong as to make them consider the es- 
sence of cause as lying to some extent in 
the realm of the supernatural. Bacon does 
not treat very particularly of cause and ef- 
fect. He notices with a word of approba- 
tion the Aristotelian causes, and explains 
in his De Azigmentis, in the fourth book, 
how important a part causes play in na- 
ture. The material and efficient cause he 
puts in the realm of physics, formal and 
final in the realm of metaphysics. Des- 
cartes took a most superficial view of cause, 
as did all the Cartesian school of France 
and all the dogmatic school of Germany. 
Malebranche, by denying the existence of 
any efficient causes except God, placed the 
causal problem in the domain of theology. 
The views of Spinoza and of Leibnitz de- 
serve, however, some attention. The for- 
mer in the first book of his Ethics lays 
down with a show of mathematical precis- 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 135 

ion, but without critical explanation, his 
Doctrine of Cause. It is interesting to see 
great problems treated in this severe and 
simple, although it must be admitted in- 
sufficient, manner. The first definition in 
the first book of his remarkable work shows 
the prominence which the idea of cause 
had in his mind. 

"By its own cause," he says, "I under- 
stand that the essence of which involves 
existence, or that which by its nature can 
only be conceived as existing." (Def. 1.) 

Proposition xxv. of the same book as- 
serts that " God is not only the efficient 
cause of the existence of things, but of 
their essence also." And in the demon- 
stration of proposition xxxvi. he says : 
" Whatever exists expresses the nature or 
essence of God in a certain and determi- 
nate manner ; that is, whatever exists ex- 
presses the power of God, who is the cause 
of all things in a certain determinate 
manner ; thus and therefore nothing exists 
from which some effect does not follow." 



136 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

The effects of nature are thus simply the 
manifestations of a mode of God's attri- 
butes. 

Before noticing the views of Leibnitz on 
this subject, which involve a notice of the 
doctrine of Locke, it may be well to glance 
again at English philosophy, and see what 
position was occupied by Hobbes. Ac- 
cording to him, all causes are but effects 
of the first cause, which is God. (IV. 
246.) He recognizes the universality and 
necessity of the law of causation, and the 
doctrine takes a prominent place in his 
writings on account of its intimate asso- 
ciation with his definition of philosophy. 
Lotze, in his Metaphysics, gives to Her- 
bart the credit of being the first to point 
out the duality of causes. The doctrine of 
the duality of causes, usually assigned to 
Mr. John Stuart Mill, may be found im- 
plied in the ninth chapter of Hobbes's Ele- 
menta Philosophica. "A cause simply or 
an entire cause is the aggregate of all the 
accidents both of the agents, how many 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 13J 

soever they be and of the patient put to- 
gether ; which, when they are all supposed 
to be present, it cannot be understood but 
that the effect is produced at the same in- 
stant ; and if any one of them be wanting, 
it cannot be understood but that the effect 
is not produced." He points out also that 
the efficient cause must precede the effect 
(II. 6jf) y shows that a thing cannot be im- 
agined to begin without a cause. In short, 
there is no writer in the English language 
who returns so constantly to the consider- 
ation of causality as Thomas Hobbes ; but 
the appreciation of the true character of 
the problem was left to his successors. 
Most men could give as satisfactory an 
explanation of cause and effect as John 
Locke does in the well-known passage 
from the second book of his Essay : — 

" In the notice that our senses take of the 
constant vicissitude of things we cannot 
but observe that several particulars, both 
qualities and substances, begin to exist ; 
and that they receive this their existence 



138 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

from the due application and operation of 
some other being. From this observation 
we get our ideas of cause and effect. That 
which produces any simple or complex 
idea we denote by the general name 
cause ; and that which is produced, ef- 
fect" (Bk. II. 26.) 

He concludes : — 

" For to have the idea of cause and ef- 
fect, it suffices to consider any simple idea 
or substance as beginning to exist by the 
operation of some other without knowing 
the manner of that operation." (Ibid.) 

A good commentary on the above is 
furnished by the reply of Theophile to 
Philalethe in the dialogue of Leibnitz's 
Nouveaux Essais. 

Philalethe begins : " Cause is that 
which produces any simple or complex 
idea ; effect is that which is produced.' 3 

Theophile : " I see that you often mean 
by idea, the objective reality of the idea or 
quality which it represents. You define 
only the efficient cause. . . . You must ac- 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 139 

knowledge that when you say, the efficient 
cause is that which produces, the effect 
that which is produced, you deal only with 
synonymous terms." 

Leibnitz himself avoids the difficulty by 
denying all causality except immanent cau- 
sality of the monads, which to him are the 
ultimate principles of being. There is no 
effect produced except the effect produced 
by the monad on itself. The theory of 
Preestablished Harmony, while not neces- 
sarily pantheistic, makes cause and effect 
merely a relation between each monad and 
its own more or less fully developed con- 
sciousness. 

To David Hume the world owes much, 
and among other things the debt incurred 
by his having shown that if Empiricism be 
the only true method, Philosophy is bank- 
rupt. Hume's doctrine of Causation, as 
every student of philosophy knows, was 
the central point of the important war 
waged among thinkers of England, Scot- 
land, and Germany, in the last part of 



140 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. If, as Hume taught, 
all our knowledge is derived from impres- 
sions and ideas, and if we have no impres- 
sion of necessary connection or of power 
in the universe, then there can be but one 
explanation of cause and effect. If that 
explanation fails, the problem is insoluble. 
We have, therefore, to trace the develop- 
ment of Hume's doctrine in the philosophy 
of the younger Mill ; notice the vain strug- 
gle of the latter to retain the position of 
the former, and finally to note the virtual 
abandonment of the problem by Herbert 
Spencer. 

It is hardly necessary for me to give a 
detailed account of Hume's doctrine. It 
is probably quite well known to everybody. 
I shall quote only his general statement. 
The key to Hume's position is furnished 
in a foot-note in Section VII of his In- 
quiry concerning the Human Understand- 
ing, where he comments on Locke's doc- 
trine of Causation. He there argues, that, 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 141 

in view of Locke's own admission that rea- 
soning can give no new simple idea, it can- 
not be held that reasoning may give us an 
idea of power. Following out logically his 
own doctrine that what we perceive may be 
resolved into impressions and ideas, Hume 
maintains that neither the power of cause 
to produce the effect, nor the necessary 
connection between cause and effect, are 
objects of knowledge. While willing to 
admit a principle of union among ideas, he 
denies that there is any impression of 
power or necessary connection, or any idea 
of power or necessary connection. He has 
but one alternative, which is expressed in 
his general conclusion : — 

" We have no other notion of cause and 
effect but that of certain objects which 
have been always conjoined together, and 
which in all times past have been found 
inseparable. We cannot penetrate into 
the reason of the conjunction. We only 
observe the thing itself, and always find 
that from the constant conjunction, the ob- 



142 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

jects acquire an union in the imagination." 
(Hum. Nature, Part III, Sec. 6.) 

This is quite in accordance with a state- 
ment made by him in the earlier part of 
his treatise, that " every demonstration 
which has been produced for the necessity 
of a cause is fallacious and sophistical/ 3 
(lb. Part III.) 

In Section 15 of the Third Part of the 
same work he lays down eight rules for 
the determination of cause and effect, and 
in discussing these certainly lays himself 
open to some pointed criticism. 

Hume met with opposition in both Scot- 
land and Germany. In the former coun- 
try, Reid opposed him with his theory of 
common sense. In the latter, Kant estab- 
lished the critical philosophy. 

It is to the Kantian system that I shall 
first turn. 

It is difficult to give an exposition of any 
part of this remarkable philosophy without 
passing over the whole, and the doctrine of 
cause and effect is so important a part 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 143 

that its exposition is doubly difficult. It is 
well known that Kant admitted Hume's 
proposition that experience gives the ma- 
terials of knowledge. He denied that ex- 
perience gives all knowledge, and pro- 
ceeded to show that the forms of sensibil- 
ity do not come with the phenomena a 
posteriori but are a priori ; that the un- 
derstanding possesses spontaneity, and 
that from the judgments of the under- 
standing are to be deduced the forms of 
the understanding, which when filled by 
the intuition, constitute our knowledge of 
nature. Among these forms or concepts 
of the understanding is that of cause and 
effect. (I am aware that the above ex- 
planation is open to some objection ; it is 
so because space is wanting for a more 
thorough or explicit statement of the doc- 
trine.) 

To state the doctrine plainly, the law of 
causation is not a law of sensibility, but a 
law of judgment. It comes not from the 
phenomena received by the mind ; it is the 



144 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

form in which the phenomena are under- 
stood "to be related." The causal judg- 
ment is involved, then, in the very succes- 
sion of objects in time as conceived of by 
the understanding. Causality is not a de- 
duction from phenomena, but a law accord- 
ing to which we judge of phenomena. 
As it has been clearly put by Professor 
Harms : — 

" The Law of Causality is only a Law or 
Form of our thought, because we cannot 
represent to ourselves anything coming 
into or passing out of being ; since we can 
observe all changes succeeding one another 
in time. This succession, as the order of 
it cannot be changed, establishes a rule 
according to which it takes place." 

Without speaking of the treatment of 
this subject by the absolute philosophers, I 
may pause for a moment before passing 
from Germany to notice the views held on 
causality by Schopenhauer. 

The doctrine of causality is discussed in 
his early work, "Die vierfache Wurzel 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 145 

des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde." 
The principle of causation is the ground 
(Grund) of all becoming. Every change is 
preceded by a change. Causation is an 
objective law: "It maybe regarded as a 
mechanical law in the physical world, an 
organic law in relation to the living body, 
but in the world of mind it appears as 
motive.' 1 

As was said above, Hume met with op- 
position from Reid as well as from Kant. 
Reid held that the only efficient causes are 
subjects which possess "thought, under- 
standing, and will." Physical causes are 
not efficient, they are not agents ; they are 
acted upon, but are themselves passive. 
He criticises Hume's doctrine, and was the 
first to use against him the illustration of 
the succession of day and night. 

Dugald Stewart regarded the law of cau- 
sation as a fundamental law of belief,, which 
made it necessary that we should rise from 
effect to cause. Like Reid, however, he 
seems to have been inclined to limit effi- 



146 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

cient causes to non-physical agents ; and 
this, evidently, as has been pointed out by 
some of his critics, reduces his view of 
causality in the physical world to some- 
thing approaching the doctrine of Hume. 

It was the doctrine of Dr. Thomas 
Brown as to cause and effect which called 
forth the severe criticisms of Sir William 
Hamilton, who was fond of finding fault 
with that gifted philosophical writer. The 
training of Brown himself and the tradi- 
tions of Hume explain to some extent the 
former's doctrine. As has often been no- 
ticed, Brown clearly showed that there was 
no tertium quid intermediate between a 
cause and its effect. He saw that to at- 
tempt to explain causality in this way was 
simply to repeat the difficulty when one 
endeavored to explain the relation of cause 
to this supposed intermediate something. 
He follows the opinion of Hume that cau- 
sality is only another name for invariable 
antecedence and consequence ; but, unlike 
Hume, holds that our belief in causality is 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 147 

determined by intuition, and not by the ex- 
perience of uniformity. 

As is well known, Sir William Hamil- 
ton's doctrine of causality depends on his 
doctrine of the conditioned. Unlike many 
philosophers, he holds that our belief in 
the existence of a cause for a given event 
comes not from an intuitive power, but 
from a mental impotency. " We are," he 
says, " utterly unable to realize in thought 
the possibility of the complement of exist- 
ence being either increased or diminished. 
We are unable on the one hand to con- 
ceive of nothing becoming something, or 
on the other something becoming nothing. 
. . . Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse 
reverti expresses in its purest form the 
whole intellectual phenomenon of causal- 
ity." 

I come now to another representative of 
the doctrine of Hume to John Stuart Mill, 
and shall endeavor to state briefly his view 
of causality as contained in his system of 
Logic. 



148 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

His doctrine of Cause in general is only 
a form of the doctrine of David Hume. 
The knowledge obtained by sensation is 
reproduced according to the Laws of Asso- 
ciation. The law of association is, accord- 
ing to him, sufficient to account for all 
mental states or action, however complex, 
and causality may be expressed in terms 
corresponding to association. 

It will not be unfair, so far as the pur- 
pose of this paper is concerned, to limit 
my notice of John Stuart Mill's discussion 
of Causation to the special point where his 
definition passes beyond the definition of 
Hume, where he avoids or attempts to 
avoid certain difficulties to which Hume's 
definition and doctrine were undoubtedly 
open. Reid urged the plausible objection, 
as we have just seen, that invariable suc- 
cession in some -instances was not the 
same with causation. Mill writes as fol- 
lows : — 

" When we define the cause of a thing 
to be the antecedent which it invari- 



• • • 












The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 149 

ably follows," we do not use this phrase as 
exactly synonymous with " the antecedent 
which it invariably has followed in our past 
experience." Such a mode of causation 
would, he says, be open to Reid's objec- 
tion. If there can exist a condition not 
necessary to the production of a certain ef- 
fect, there is no cause present ; and he con- 
tinues : " If there be any meaning which 
confessedly belongs to the term necessity 
it is unconditionalness. That which is ne- 
cessary, that which must be, means that 
which will be, whatever supposition we 
may make in regard to all other things." 
" Invariable sequence, therefore, is not 
synonymous with causation unless the se- 
quence, besides being invariable, is uncon- 
ditional. We may define, therefore, the 
cause of a phenomenon to be the antece- 
dent or concurrence of antecedents on 
which it is invariably and unconditionally 
consequent." (III. v. Logic) 

After showing that our knowledge of 
space and time is purely relative, and that 



150 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

space and time as such are unthinkable, 
Mr. Herbert Spencer turns his attention 
to Cause. 

" We are no more able to form a circum- 
scribed idea of Cause than of Space or 
Time, and we are consequently obliged to 
think of the cause which transcends the 
limits of our thought as positive, though 
indefinite. Just in the same manner that 
on conceiving of any bounded space there 
arises the nascent consciousness of space 
outside the bounds, so when we think of 
any definite cause there arises a nascent 
consciousness of a cause behind it ; and 
in the one case like the other, this nas- 
cent consciousness is in substance like that 
which suggests it, though without form. 
The momentum of thought invariably car- 
ries us beyond conditioned existence to 
unconditioned existence, and this ever per- 
sists in us as the body of a thought to 
which we can give no shape." (First Prin- 
ciples, 93.) We are told later on that ab- 
solute reality "is some mode of the un- 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 151 

knowable, related to the matter we know- 
as cause to effect/ 5 This partly separates 
Mr. Spencer's position as to cause from 
the position of John Stuart Mill, for as a 
mode of the unknowable can hardly be re- 
garded as knowable — otherwise it would 
make the unknowable, knowable — one can- 
not reasonably suppose that such a mode 
has been observed as the invariable and 
unconditional antecedent of matter. 

In his Psychology, vol. ii., in a chapter on 
the Relation of Sequence, we have the fol- 
lowing : " Thus the relation of sequence, 
considered subjectively as a change in con- 
sciousness, is of three general kinds. The 
fortuitous, in which the two terms are as 
nearly as may be alike in their tendency, 
or want of tendency, subsequently to sug- 
gest each other ; and in which the change 
may be reversed in thought with a feeling 
of non-resistance like that with which it 
originally occurred. The probable, in which 
the terms are unlike in their tendency to 
suggest each other ; but in which the usual 



1 52 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

order of the terms may be inverted with 
but little effort. And the necessary, in 
which the antecedent being presented or 
represented to consciousness, the conse- 
quent cannot be prevented from following; 
and in which the direction of the change 
cannot be changed. ,, 

Mr. Spencer thus holds a middle position 
between the schools of Hume and Kant. 
He admits a case of causality in the relation 
of the unknowable to the world of phe- 
nomena. 

It is quite evident from what has just 
been gone over that the problem of causal- 
ity was not appreciated in its true signifi- 
cance until the time of David Hume. 
Former philosophers noticed Cause and 
Effect but did not explain the terms. The 
solution of Hume was the result of the em- 
pirical method, and the result was logical. 
The point at issue is evidently a point be- 
tween the a posteriori and the a priori 
methods, and without further specific re- 
mark I shall proceed to the general discus- 
sion of the question now before us. 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 153 

If we look at the phenomenal world alone 
the theory of Herbert Spencer as to Causa- 
tion resembles closely that of John Stuart 
Mill. It is evidently the result of some 
kind of association. The doctrine of the 
latter shows the insufficiency of Hume's 
view of the subject. If our belief in the 
necessity of the causal relation in future 
time is the result of an observance of mere 
succession in the past, then our position is 
that described by Hume. It is open to the 
objection of Reid. If more is involved, if it 
be held that invariable, unconditional pro- 
spective sequence is essential in the idea 
of Causality, the question arises, On what 
grounds does our belief in the invariability 
and unconditionalness of future sequences 
rest ? If we say, on past succession, we 
are once more in Hume's position. If we 
hold that other elements enter in to deter- 
mine the invariability and unconditional- 
ness, we must ask, what are these ele- 
ments ? 

To answer this question is to solve the 



154 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

problem of Causation. Mill does not an- 
swer it. Unsatisfied with the position of 
Hume, he finds no escape from that po- 
sition in the empirical method. It is evi- 
dent that the experience of the individual 
gives only succession. As to that, one is 
obliged to agree with Hume. The ques- 
tion that arises is : Admitting the method 
of experience to be the true method, does 
invariable succession mean causality ? The 
tendency of mankind is to confound suc- 
cession, variable or invariable, with causal- 
ity. A plague following the appearance of 
a comet suggests to the uncivilized man a 
causal connection between the two. A 
period of agricultural or industrial prosper- 
ity following a certain political adminis- 
tration is used by the political orator as an 
argument in favor of such an administra- 
tion. These are, however, examples in 
many instances of the familiar fallacy post 
hoc ergo propter hoc. As men become 
more intelligent they distinguish succes- 
sion of this variable and accidental kind 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 155 

from succession, which is invariable and 
necessary. The former kind of succession 
is not regarded as an illustration of causal- 
ity ; the latter is. One has to ask, is the 
succession in the latter case invariable be- 
cause it is under the law of causation, or 
do we regard the phenomena as causally 
related because they invariably succeed 
one another ? The answer to these ques- 
tions is the crucial test of Hume's doc- 
trine. It is necessary at this point to em- 
phasize the proposition that to say that 
causality is a necessary law is not to say 
that the cause of a specific event or effect 
is given necessarily, but only that, given an 
event, the event must necessarily have a 
cause. One who looked at the combustion 
of a quantity of gunpowder brought about 
by the application of fire might say that 
the cause was either the motive in the 
mind of the agent who applied the fire or 
the act of volition which effected that ap- 
plication, or the properties in the fire and 
in the gunpowder. Men might differ ac- 



1 56 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

cording to their information in pronoun- 
cing judgment as to the cause, yet all would 
agree that the explosion was caused. The 
simpler the case which illustrates causality 
the easier the exhibition of the law itself. 

What, then, is it that gives uncondition- 
alness to the succession of cause and ef- 
fect ? There is nothing in the nature of 
succession that makes a necessary con- 
nection. Indeed, there is no such thing as 
necessary succession so far as thought is 
concerned, for one may always imagine or 
conceive a change of antecedent condi- 
tions which would alter any ordinary suc- 
cession of events. If we adopt the method 
of pure experience, we can never get 
necessity, for, as was said above, Hume 
showed that the mere observance of phe- 
nomena following one another was not the 
observance of phenomena connected with 
one another. At what point, then, does 
this inevitable necessity arise ? 

One explanation is as follows : The mind 
has an intuitive knowledge of substance ; 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 757 

Substance being that which possesses Be- 
ing — for it is Permanency, i. e. y exist- 
ence, independent of our perception of the 
substance and potency or power. From 
this point of view, a cause is a substance 
possessing power. When that power is 
exercised, an effect is produced. When 
any event or change in nature is observed, 
the mind intuitively judges that a sub- 
stance possessing power is the cause of 
that event or change. It is a cause of 
which the given change or event is an ef- 
fect. Here we have evidently a satisfac- 
tory solution of the problem of cause and 
effect, provided that it can be shown that 
there is an intuitive knowledge of sub- 
stance and of power ; provided also that it 
can be explained what is meant by sub- 
stance and by power. Passing over for 
the present the difficult metaphysical ques- 
tion, "What is substance ?" let us inquire, 
" What is meant by potency or power ? ' 
As Aristotle pointed out, power may be 
one of two kinds. There may be power in 



1 58 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

the sense of AiW/u? or potentiality — a 
capacity to act or to be made to act. This 
is evidently not power, in the causal sense. 
Cause is a relative term ; it implies an ef- 
fect. If the power be not active there is 
no cause, for active power is necessary for 
the production of an effect. But power 
in its other signification is active. It is 
the Evtpyaa of Aristotle ; it is already pro- 
ducing an effect, and it is this active power 
which constitutes cause. But on reaching 
this point, we find that like Locke we are 
dealing with synonymous terms. When I 
call a cause a substance with active power, 
I am simply stating in other language that 
a cause is a substance which is a cause; 
that is, a cause is a cause. If it be said, 
the term is ultimate like the terms knowl- 
edge and faith, that we cannot state them 
in any simpler terms, then I am evidently 
wasting energy in attempting to explain 
the proposition " Every effect must have a 



cause." 



Another explanation of this necessity 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 159 

which characterizes causality in the judg- 
ment is that which is founded on a theory 
of knowledge which bases the law of cau- 
sation, as it bases all so-called necessary 
truth, on the repeated sensations of the in- 
dividual and the accumulated experience of 
the race transmitted from generation to 
generation under the Law of Heredity. 
This theory is based on a vast and compre- 
hensive generalization, the result of which 
is the conclusion that all Life is One ; that 
Man is a part of a great organism in pro- 
cess of evolution, or perhaps in process of 
dissolution ; that the physical condition of 
man cannot be separated from the life of 
nature ; that nature itself can explain all 
that is most simple or most complicated in 
man's most simple and complicated mind. 
There are, it is said, successions in nature 
which are repeated again and again in the 
individual mind, by means of a nervous or- 
ganization which seems to be stretched out 
wistfully to touch, to know that which is 
its source and its life. As we look back- 



i6o Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ward, age after age, we see this repetition 
constant and invariable. We find that 
physical characteristics and mental quali- 
ties of the most varied kinds are trans- 
mitted from generation to generation. At 
rare intervals peculiarities of structure 
which exist in the lower species are repro- 
duced in the higher species. Appetites, 
desires, intellectual tendencies, descend 
from parents to children. Normal and ab- 
normal traits of body and of character seem 
to be stamped upon families and upon 
races ; and all necessary truth, mathemat- 
ical, metaphysical, moral, is the result of 
the teaching of nature. Nature, being in- 
variable, teaches by endless repetition the 
same great lesson. This invariable suc- 
cession of causes or effects in the nervous 
system is accompanied by a correspond- 
ence of psychical phenomena, and the in- 
variability of causes in nature is repro- 
duced by invariability in the organism of 
belief in natural causes. Is not this, then, 
the object of our investigation ? Have we 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 161 

not reached a point beyond the objections 
to which the theories of Hume and of his 
opponents are open ? 

It must be asked, in the first place, 
whether the reproduction of individuals or 
of species produces any essential change 
in the law of succession. If A alone can- 
not reach necessity by observing invariable 
succession among certain events of nature, 
will one thousand generations of A's reach 
such necessity ? Where does invariable 
succession resolve itself into connection ? 
Why even should repeated nervous motion 
resolve itself into connected nervous mo- 
tion ? 

It must be asked, in the second place : 
If we are to account for the unconditional- 
ness of the law of cause and effect, is the 
law from which we deduce the necessity 
of causality an unconditional law ? It is 
hardly necessary for me to say that in the 
present undeveloped condition of science, 
the law of heredity has been only partially 
understood. There is a constant fluctua- 



/ 62 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

tion in the transmission of qualities from 
species to species, from individual to indi- 
vidual. No special mental quality that 
can be shown to have been directly trans- 
mitted can be shown to be a necessary 
quality. If the law of heredity be made 
the ground of unconditional truth, it must 
be shown to be as unconditional as the 
truth derived from it. 

I have laid down these somewhat dog- 
matic propositions with some diffidence, for 
I do not profess to understand altogether 
how far hereditary tendencies have been 
shown to be constant. 

Assuming this to be the true explana- 
tion of the law of causality as of all neces- 
sary truth, a difficulty arises which appears 
to be insuperable. We are now face to 
face with the most important and far-reach- 
ing doctrine of Modern Philosophy. We 
have to ask, What is the true theory of 
knowledge ? The question is most signifi- 
cant. Its answer is most difficult. With 
respect to the particular point at issue, one 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 163 

of two general positions may be taken. 
Man may be explained by explaining Na- 
ture — the mind of man as well as his 
body. Or Nature may be explained by ex- 
plaining man. In Greek Philosophy be- 
fore the time of the Sophists, Nature was 
made the central point and man was con- 
sidered as a part of Nature. Certain of the 
Sophists, notably Protagoras, by an almost 
Copernican revolution reversed the order, 
and asserted explicitly or implicitly the 
Homo Mensura doctrine. This gave point 
to the inquiry of Socrates, " What is the 
true knowledge ? " The issue is before us 
to-day. What is Nature ? Is it that from 
which we must seek the explanation of our 
knowledge, or is nature simply what we 
know ? If I, or A, or B, or C, were Nature, 
an affirmative answer to the former ques- 
tion would be imperative. But what do 
we find to be the case ? Is Nature any- 
thing except what we know ? Nature is 
only a name for knowledge. Our knowl- 
edge is the sum of Nature. The principles 



164 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

of Nature cannot be employed to explain 
knowledge. A far more difficult problem 
is before us. We must explain the princi- 
ples of knowledge first, for Nature is only 
what we know. To explain knowledge 
from Nature is dogmatism, for we first as- 
sume a being called Nature that appears to 
us only in terms of knowledge ; we take 
this Nature and deduce from it the princi- 
ples of that which makes Nature what it is. 
Nature without knowledge is nothing. De- 
stroy my mind, and Nature ceases to exist 
for me. Destroy the minds of A, B, C, 
and D, and Nature ceases to exist for them. 
Destroy mind in the created universe, and 
Nature ceases to exist for the created uni- 
verse. Destroy — I say it reverently — 
the mind of God, and Nature ceases to ex- 
ist. If it be said it still exists but is not 
known, it must be answered that unless it 
is known to exist one cannot scientifically 
affirm that it exists ; and this I apprehend 
is the beginning of all Philosophy. One 
must assume knowledge ; to doubt that we 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 165 

know is to doubt that we doubt, and Phi- 
losophy is not possible unless knowledge is 
possible. After knowing Nature, one can- 
not begin and work backward to knowl- 
edge. One must begin with knowledge; 
and here I believe one must begin with 
the problem of Cause and Effect. If we 
take, for example, the fundamental princi- 
ple of Herbert Spencer, we find that it in- 
volves a dogmatism as decided as the dog- 
matism of Wolff or Reid. Force is made 
to explain all ; but what is Force ? Is it 
the simple ultimate idea from which one 
may construct the universe of mind and 
matter? On the contrary, it is an idea 
which involves some of the most important 
principles of knowledge. To assume that 
there is Force, before assuming that there 
is knowledge, is as peculiar as to assume 
that the sunbeam exists before the sun. 

I am far from wishing that Philosophy 
should rest on the Hegelian foundation. 
What seems to me to be certainly true is 
this. We have a knowledge of the uni- 



1 66 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

verse communicated by the various senses. 
These senses do not give us the law of 
Causality, yet we judge that material phe- 
nomena are connected by the law of Cau- 
sality. If this law be a fiction, why do we 
judge that it is necessary ? If it be not a 
fiction and be not derived from the phe- 
nomena which present themselves, is it not 
a law of that which knows the phenom- 
ena ? I am disposed to think that it is a 
law of knowledge, i. e. a law of judgment, 
— a form of Thought. The mind ob- 
serves a manifold series of phenomena. It 
is compelled to pronounce a causal judg- 
ment. The necessity of that judgment 
depends on the existence of mind. If one 
asks, Suppose Mind to be annihilated, does 
the necessity of Causation exist ? I an- 
swer, Suppose Mind to be annihilated, does 
Nature exist as we know it ? If one fur- 
ther asks, Suppose the law to be a mental 
one under which we class causality, are not 
the phenomena mental phenomena ? the 
answer is plain. What is meant by the 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 167 

external world ? It is the world that is 
known in the form of Space. If one asks, 
Is the heat which comes from the fire ob- 
served to be causally connected with the 
fire by a subjective law ? I answer yes. If 
it be asked, Is that law objective as well? 
I answer, I do not know, for I cannot go 
beyond my own knowledge. If it be asked, 
Are the phenomena so observed, phenom- 
ena of an external world ? I answer yes ; 
but I add the question, What is meant by 
external ? Is not the question tautolo- 
gous ? If I say, this table is external, I 
mean it is like this chair, that book, that 
man, that horse ; but if I repeat that as- 
sertion, that book is external or that horse 
is external, I mean that it has externality, 
just as the table has externality. I am no 
nearer the solution of the problem. 

But in conclusion I would say, that if so 
ultimate a term as causality be in any de- 
gree definable it will be found to involve 
the following elements : A cause is : — 

1. An antecedent. 



1 68 Some Problems of Philosophy. 

2. It is judged to be a necessary ante- 
cedent, i. e. if the event B follows A ; not 
Nature, but Mind judges that A is the 
cause of B. 

3. If an event B occur, the mind judges 
that there must be a cause, be it x, y, or z, 
the cause in each case being an antece- 
dent — a necessary antecedent, something 
that is judged to be a necessary event be- 
fore the consequent can follow as a neces- 
sary event. 

4. The sequence is necessary, not be- 
cause it is invariably observed, but be- 
cause the mind judges that it is necessary. 

5. The necessity of cause continues 
even when the cause is absent from our 
view, for on the presence of a given event 
a cause is judged to be necessary. 

6. The succession of cause and effect is 
not the same with the uniformity of Na- 
ture. The uniformity of Nature is based 
on past experience. The Law of Causation 
is a priori. I undoubtedly believe that fire 
will cause heat in the future because it has 



The Doctrine of Cause and Effect. 169 

caused it in the past, but the connection 
between the fire and the heat is causal. 
If I attempt to resolve the connection into 
a mere succession, I find, indeed, succes- 
sion, but I find something beside, and that 
something is the causal nexus. 

In the specific example the mind may 
err as to what the cause is ; it never errs 
in the necessary judgment that a cause 
exists. Of course, if fire be fire and heat 
be heat, I cannot violate the law of contra- 
diction and conceive of fire without heat, 
for one of the elements in the concept fire 
is the phenomenon heat. But suppose 
with eyes closed I am brought close to a 
hot body, I am liable to make mistakes as 
to what that hot body is, but I know that 
there must be a cause for the heat which I 
feel. All such questions as those of John 
Stuart Mill, as to why one instance in 
some cases suffices to establish the fact of 
causal connection, and in others a large 
number of instances is necessary, are idle. 
The law of causality is illustrated when- 



i jo Some Problems of Philosophy. 

ever the mind judges concerning a new 
phenomenon, and the law is as inexorable 
in the first individual instance as it is after 
a thousand observations. Superstition and 
ignorance are quite compatible with the 
most emphatic affirmation of the causal 
judgment. 

Whatever be our view of the question, 
no one can fail to be impressed by the fact 
of Causation itself. It is the path which 
leads us backward through stage after 
stage of the life of Nature ; it is the clue 
to many mysteries of History. All the 
possibilities of action in Science, Art, and 
Religion are dependent on the action of 
this law. 



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